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Opinions of The and the Court of Appeals To be used in
conjunction with the CPS Criminal Procedure Textbook |
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CPS Commonwealth
Police Service, Inc. and the Law Office of Patrick Michael Rogers |
Commonwealth v. Snyder, 413
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Argued
Decided
Juliane Balliro,
Paul J. Caccaviello, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.
Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, LYNCH and
GREANEY, JJ.
WILKINS, Justice.
This
appeal concerns Jeffrey Snyder, who, at the time of the events involved here,
was an eighteen year old high school senior in a
Snyder
argues that, when the school administrators looked for and took marihuana found
in his locker, they violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable
searches and seizures. He also contends
that the school administrators violated his rights by not giving him Miranda
warnings before questioning him. During
that questioning, the defendant confessed to having sold a bag of marihuana to
a fellow student [413
We
conclude that the defendant's arguments lack merit. We, therefore, need not consider the separate
question whether, if one or more of his contentions were valid, the evidence
obtained in violation of his rights should not have been admitted in evidence
at his trial.
We recite
facts that were found by the judge who denied the defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence. We supplement
them with details from the uncontroverted testimony of the school
administrators and a Great Barrington police officer.
Linda Day,
the principal of
The school
administrators decided to locate Snyder.
Canning found Snyder in the student center, which was crowded with students.
From a distance Canning could not see Snyder's book bag. Canning and Day then consulted. They did not know if other students were
involved. Nor did they know the full
extent of the marihuana. They did not
want to arouse suspicion. The
administrators decided not to approach Snyder in the student center but rather
to wait until the beginning of the next school period (about 1:20 P.M.), when [413 Mass. 524] Snyder was scheduled to be in a class, and then search Snyder's
locker for the book bag. At that time,
Canning and Day, using the combination to the locker that was available at the
school's main office, opened the locker.
They found the book bag, the video cassette case, and three bags
containing marihuana. They took these
items to Day's office and concealed them behind her desk.
Day then
located Snyder and brought him to her office.
There, in Canning's presence, Day asked Snyder if it was true, as
reported to her, that he had offered to sell marihuana in the school. Snyder admitted that he had. Snyder, who was upset, said that he could not
believe this was happening and that he had never done this before. He said that a friend had given him the
marihuana to sell, that he had become troubled about doing it, and that he had
called his friend to come to the school at two o'clock to take back what he had
not sold. Snyder admitted that the book
bag, the video cassette case, and the bags of marihuana were his. Snyder said that there had been four bags of
marihuana but that he had sold one for twenty‑five dollars to a
student. Day called Snyder's mother, who
came to the school. Canning called the
police. (FN1) Snyder was allowed to meet with his girl
friend alone in Day's office before the police came.
Shortly
before two o'clock, Officer Beckwith of the Great Barrington police department
arrived at the school. Day recited what
Snyder had said; Beckwith gave Snyder
his Miranda warnings; and Snyder
confirmed that Day's recitation was true.
Not long after that, the person who had provided Snyder with the
marihuana, a graduate of the school, was located in the school. (FN2)
Officer Beckwith took Snyder to the police station shortly before 2:30
P.M. where the officer again warned Snyder of his rights. Snyder signed a rights waiver [413 Mass. 525] and gave a written statement, the substance of which Officer
Beckwith testified to at Snyder's trial.
The motion
judge denied Snyder's motion to suppress the evidence found in Snyder's locker
and the admissions that Snyder made to Day, Canning, and Beckwith. The argument that the statements made to Beckwith
should be suppressed, even though Beckwith had given the defendant Miranda
warnings, was based on the theory that this evidence would not have been
obtained if Day and Canning had not already violated Snyder's rights by failing
to advise him of those rights. The
motion judge concluded that, because Snyder had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his locker, the locker search did not violate Snyder's
constitutional rights. He concluded
alternatively that the school authorities had reasonable suspicion that a crime
had been committed and that the search of Snyder's locker was, therefore,
reasonable. He further concluded that
the defendant's admissions were made in circumstances that were fair and
proper.
[1] Snyder
waived a jury trial, and on April 8, 1991, a judge in the Pittsfield District
Court found Snyder guilty of (1) illegal possession of a class D substance, (2)
possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute it, and (3)
possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute it in a
school. The judge sentenced Snyder to
one day in a house of correction on the charge of possession of a class D
substance with intent to distribute it (G.L. c. 94C, § 32C [1990 ed.] ), and
two years in a house of correction, following service of the first sentence, on
the charge of possession of a class D substance with intent to distribute it in
a public high school (G.L. c. 94C, § 32J [1990 ed.] ). The charge of simple possession was placed on
file with the defendant's consent. The
trial judge stayed execution of the sentence pending Snyder's appeal, which we
transferred to this court. (FN3)
[413 Mass. 526] 1. We consider first the question whether the search of Snyder's
locker violated Snyder's rights.
[2] The
motion judge's conclusion that Snyder had no legitimate expectation of privacy
in his school locker was wrong. Recent
decisions elsewhere have recognized that, barring some express understanding to
the contrary, students have a reasonable and protected expectation of privacy
in their school lockers. See State v. Engerud, 94 N.J. 331, 348, 463
A.2d 934 (1983); State v. Michael G., 106 N.M. 644, 646,
748 P.2d 17 (Ct.App.1987); In re Dumas, 357 Pa.Super. 294, 297, 515
A.2d 984 (1986); State v. Joseph T., 175 W.Va. 598, 606,
336 S.E.2d 728 (1985). In this case, the
school administration explicitly acknowledged in the students' rights and
responsibility code that each student had the right "[n]ot to have his/her
locker subjected to unreasonable search."
In light of this assurance from the school administration, it is
especially clear that Snyder had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
locker that was entitled to constitutional protection. See New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338, 105 S.Ct. 733, 741, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985);
Commonwealth v. Panetti, 406 Mass. 230, 231, 547 N.E.2d 46
(1989). Because Snyder had such a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker, he was entitled to argue that
his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
was violated by the search of his locker and the seizure of the marihuana and
to argue, therefore, that the evidence seized (and all evidence subsequently
obtained as fruits of the unlawful seizure) must be suppressed. [413
Mass. 527] He was entitled to make a
similar argument under art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, both
because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his locker and because he
had automatic standing to challenge the lawfulness of the seizure of the
marihuana (see Commonwealth v. Frazier,
410 Mass. 235, 242‑244, 571 N.E.2d 1356 [1991] ), possession of which was
an element of each crime with which he was charged.
[3] We
have little difficulty in concluding that the search conducted without the
authority of a search warrant did not violate Snyder's rights under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution.
The test under the Fourth Amendment for school administrators is whether
the search of the locker was reasonable in all the circumstances. See New
Jersey v. T.L.O., supra 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 742;
Commonwealth v. Carey, 407 Mass. 528, 533, 554 N.E.2d 1199 (1990)
(upholding warrantless search of student locker as not violating Fourth
Amendment; defendant made no proper
claim that search violated his parallel right under Constitution of
Commonwealth). This Fourth Amendment
test is a lower standard than the traditional one, which requires that there be
a search warrant (barring circumstances excusing the use of a search warrant)
and that there be probable cause to conduct the
search. (FN4) Because, as we shall subsequently explain,
there was probable cause to conduct the search, it follows logically that the
lower Federal standard applicable here is satisfied. See New
Jersey v. T.L.O., supra 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 742
("reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search"). (FN5)
[413 Mass. 528] [4] The more substantial issue in this case is whether the search
and seizure was unreasonable under art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights of the
Constitution of the Commonwealth. In
construing the Constitution of the Commonwealth, we are not bound to follow the
standards that the Supreme Court of the United States has adopted in applying
provisions of the Constitution of the United States that are similar or even
identical to provisions in the Commonwealth's Constitution. Commonwealth v. Upton, 394
Mass. 363, 372‑373, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985).
We agree
with the Supreme Court of the United States that no search warrant was
required. It is consistent with the
requirements of art. 14, except where a school employee is explicitly acting on
behalf of law enforcement officials, for a school employee to conduct a search
and seize drugs (guns and other contraband) in a school without first obtaining
a search warrant. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra 469 U.S. at
340, 105 S.Ct. at 742 ("The warrant requirement, in particular, is
unsuited to the school environment:
requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child
suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would
unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary
procedures needed in the schools").
See also id. at 351, 353, 105
S.Ct. at 747, 748 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
There may be a question, as to a particular search, whether a school
employee had a constitutionally adequate basis to conduct the search, and there
may be a question about the scope of the search, but the absence of a search
warrant will not be a disputable factor. (FN6)
[413 Mass. 529] In deciding whether the search of the locker and the seizure of
the marihuana was constitutionally unreasonable, we need not determine whether
the requirements of art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights impose a stricter
standard than does the Fourth Amendment.
The uncontroverted evidence at the hearing on the defendant's motion to
suppress shows that the school officials had probable cause to search the
defendant's locker and, once they found the book bag, to search the bag and the
video cassette holder. Certainly, art.
14 imposes no higher standard than probable cause. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985). Thus, if there was probable cause to search
the locker when it was searched, the requirements of art. 14 were met.
We are not
dealing here with an anonymous informant but rather with a known student
who reported that he or she was an eyewitness to a crime. The faculty member to whom the student
reported the defendant's attempt to sell marihuana had a well‑established
reputation for reliability. The school
principal was justified in relying on the faculty member's report of what the
student had said. The situation is
similar to a known private citizen's eyewitness report to the police of a crime
or an attempted crime, on which the authorities are entitled to rely. See
Commonwealth v. Carey, 407 Mass. 528, 534 n. 4, 554 N.E.2d 1199
(1990); 4 W.R. LaFave, Search &
Seizure § 10.11(b ), at 170 (2d ed.
1987). (FN7)
The
remaining question is whether Principal Day and Assistant Principal Canning,
armed with reliable information that Snyder had marihuana in his book bag, were
unreasonable in searching the locker without first obtaining more information
as to the whereabouts of the book bag.
They made an attempt to do so.
They discovered where Snyder was but concluded that they should not
confront him in the student center.
Their judgment that others might be involved and [413 Mass. 530] that
they should avoid arousing the suspicion of others was reasonable. Prompt action was needed to reduce the chance
of further sales and removal of the marihuana from the school.
The school
officials were justified in concluding that there was probable cause (1) to
believe that marihuana was in Snyder's book bag and (2) to search the defendant
and his locker because the book bag was probably either in the locker or with
the defendant. Their decision to search
the locker first, the less intrusive search, rather than to search the
defendant first, was a reasonable judgment.
The school officials complied with traditional search and seizure
requirements. Consequently, the judge
was correct in ruling that the evidence found during the locker search need not
be suppressed.
2. Snyder
argues next that the statements he made to the principal and assistant
principal of his high school and to Officer Beckwith should have been
suppressed. He contends that he was
entitled to Miranda warnings before the principal and assistant principal
interrogated him and that the taint of this improper questioning infected his
admissions to Officer Beckwith, even though the officer had promptly given him
Miranda warnings. (FN8)
[5]
Without advancing any separate reasoning, Snyder also contends that the
questioning in the principal's office without the furnishing of Miranda
warnings violated his privilege against self‑incrimination stated in art.
12 of the Massachusetts[413 Mass.
531]
Declaration of Rights ("No subject shall ... be compelled to
accuse, or furnish evidence against himself"). We have not adopted Miranda or some similar
warnings as a means of protecting State constitutional rights. There has been no need to consider the
question because Miranda warnings furnish information about State
constitutional rights as well as rights contained in the Constitution of the
United States. This court, however, as
an adjunct to Miranda warnings, has provided additional protections under the
common law, protections that go beyond what the Supreme Court would require in
similar circumstances as a matter of constitutional imperative. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 412 Mass. 823,
837, 593 N.E.2d 1288 (1992); Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 402 Mass.
275, 279, 521 N.E.2d 1368 (1988), and cases cited. Snyder makes no argument, however, that we should
apply different principles and reasoning under our law from those that the
Supreme Court has applied in its Miranda
opinion and subsequently. (FN9)
[6] There
is no authority requiring a school administrator not acting on behalf of law
enforcement officials to furnish Miranda warnings. Even if we were to assume that, during the
questioning in the principal's office, the environment was coercive because
Snyder was in custody (or because his freedom[413 Mass. 532] was significantly restricted) and that,
therefore, Miranda warnings would be required if the questioning had been by
the police (see Commonwealth v. Bryant,
390 Mass. 729, 737, 459 N.E.2d 792 [1984] ), Principal Day and Assistant
Principal Canning were not law enforcement officials or agents of such
officials. The Miranda rule does not
apply to a private citizen or school administrator who is acting neither as an
instrument of the police nor as an agent of the police pursuant to a scheme to
elicit statements from the defendant by coercion or guile. See
Commonwealth v. Allen, 395 Mass. 448, 453‑454, 480 N.E.2d 630 (1985);
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, supra 402 Mass. at 278‑279, 521
N.E.2d 1368. The fact that the school
administrators had every intention of turning the marihuana over to the police
does not make them agents or instrumentalities of the police in questioning
Snyder.
The motion
judge was correct in denying the motion to suppress the defendant's statements
to the school administrators and Officer Beckwith.
3. The
defendant raises one further point to which we have not yet adverted. He argues that the motion judge erred in
refusing to direct the prosecution to disclose the name of the informants, the
faculty member and the student. The
judge ruled that disclosure of the identity of the faculty member and the
student would discourage others from making similar disclosures. He concluded that they should be protected
"from being bothered, harassed and probably confronted publicly by unthinking
individuals." He also concluded that
the defense provided no compelling reason for disclosure. The defendant moved for disclosure on the
sole ground that the informants' identities would bear on the question whether
the school administrators had probable cause to conduct the search.
[7][8] The
judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the request for disclosure. Generally nondisclosure of a source of
information, which, as here, bears on a preliminary question, such as the
suppression of evidence, is more readily tolerated than the nondisclosure at
trial of a source of evidence, where guilt or innocence is directly
involved. See Commonwealth v. [413 Mass.
533] Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 518,
554 N.E.2d 1189 (1990); Commonwealth v. Lugo, 406 Mass. 565, 571,
548 N.E.2d 1263 (1990). The government's
privilege not to disclose the identity of an informant, which is not absolute,
should be respected as far as reasonably possible consistent with fairness to a defendant. Commonwealth v. Douzanis,
384 Mass. 434, 441, 425 N.E.2d 326 (1981).
In the circumstances, the defendant's argument for disclosure is not
based on any demonstration that the identity of these informants would have
been helpful to him or even might have been helpful to him, beyond the
speculation that something beneficial might have been discovered. That mere possibility has not been enough to
require disclosure of informants in circumstances like those of this case.
Judgments affirmed.
(FN1.) The school had a policy of turning over
to the police any drugs found on the school premises.
(FN2.)
That person was tried with Snyder, convicted, and sentenced. His case is not before us.
(FN3.)
The two‑year sentence is a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment to be
served after service of the sentence on the underlying crime. A person convicted of violating G.L. c. 94C,
§ 32J, must serve the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment before being
eligible for parole, work release, or (except for limited special reasons)
furlough. See G.L. c. 94C, § 32H (1990
ed.). One might question the legislative
judgment to impose a mandatory two‑year sentence on an eighteen year old,
first‑time offender who sold only one bag of marihuana in the school,
promptly admitted his error upon confrontation, immediately manifested remorse,
and then identified his supplier. The
defendant, however, does not challenge the constitutionality of the imposition
of the mandatory sentence.
The
defendant does challenge the mandatory, consecutive sentence on the ground that
his right against being placed in jeopardy twice is violated by the imposition
of two sentences for the same criminal act.
In confronting the same argument the defendant now makes, we recently
held that, where the Legislature is explicit, as here, in directing the
imposition of two consecutive sentences for two crimes based on the same
conduct, there is no violation of double jeopardy principles.
Commonwealth v. Alvarez, 413 Mass. 224, 232, 596 N.E.2d 325 (1992).
(FN4.) Probable cause for Fourth Amendment
purposes means that there is reason to believe that a crime has been committed
and that evidence of the crime will be found in the place to be searched. See
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13 L.Ed.2d 142
(1964). See also Commonwealth v. Upton, 394 Mass. 363, 370, 476 N.E.2d 548 (1985)
("a substantial basis for concluding that any of the articles described in
the warrant are probably in the place to be searched").
(FN5.) Although the Court's opinion in the T.L.O. case specifically disclaimed
expressing "any opinion on the standards (if any) governing searches of
[lockers, desks, or other school property]" (New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra 469 U.S. at 337 n. 5, 105 S.Ct. at 740
n. 5), we are reasonably confident that the United States Supreme Court would
impose no standard higher for testing the constitutionality of the search in
the case before us than that stated in its
T.L.O. opinion.
(FN6.) We suspect that in most instances the
need to act promptly (i.e. exigent circumstances) would justify proceeding
without a warrant on traditional principles.
It appears that, in this case, any warrant requirement could be
dispensed with in any event because of the imminent threat that marihuana would
be removed from the school (or perhaps sold) before a warrant could be
obtained. It seems that Justice Brennan
was moved to agree that the warrant requirement should be dispensed with in
school search cases because of the " 'exigency'‑‑that is, from
the press of time that makes obtaining a warrant either impossible or
hopelessly infeasible." New Jersey v. T.L.O., supra 469 U.S. at
353, 356, 105 S.Ct. at 749, 750 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
(FN7.) In similar circumstances in the Carey case, where, however, there were
two student informers, this court did not have to pass on the issue but noted
that the information provided by the known informants "may well have
constituted probable cause to search [the defendant's] school locker."
Commonwealth v. Carey, supra 407 Mass. at 534 n. 4, 554 N.E.2d 1199.
(FN8.) In
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966), the Supreme Court of the United States established certain warnings
that law enforcement officers must give before questioning a suspect who is in
custody or is deprived of his freedom in a significant way, if any statement
made by the suspect is to be admissible in evidence against him. Id.
at 476, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. "Prior to
any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him,
and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. The Supreme Court adopted the rule stated in
its Miranda opinion to protect an
individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self‑incrimination. See
Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 676, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 959, 96 S.Ct. 1740, 48 L.Ed.2d 204 (1976).
(FN9.)
It is doubtful that we would require a school official to advise a student that
he or she is entitled to the presence of an attorney during questioning or that
an attorney would be appointed at public expense if that student could not
afford one. Perhaps as a matter of
policy, however, where incriminating contraband has already been seized and
where, pursuant to established practice, the evidence is to be turned over to
the police, a school official about to question a student should warn that any
statement the student makes could be used as evidence against the student. This point was not argued to the motion judge
and is not argued to this court.
It
should be noted that Snyder makes no claim that his admissions amounting to a
confession were not voluntarily made. He
makes no separate claim that he was intimidated or coerced or that his ability
to reason was in any way impaired.
A
minor is entitled to an opportunity for meaningful consultation with a parent
or interested adult to ensure any waiver of rights is knowing and intelligent
unless the minor has attained the age of fourteen and has a high degree of
intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication. Commonwealth v. A Juvenile,
389 Mass. 128, 134, 449 N.E.2d 654 (1983).