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Opinions of The and the Court of Appeals To be used in
conjunction with the CPS Criminal Procedure Textbook |
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CPS Commonwealth
Police Service, Inc. and the Law Office of Patrick Michael Rogers |
Commonwealth v. Robbins, 407
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.
Argued
Decided
Brett J. Vottero, Asst.
Dist. Atty., for the Com.
William R. Hill, Jr., Committee for Public Counsel
Services, for defendants.
Before LIACOS, C.J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.
ABRAMS, Justice.
A grand
jury in Hampden County indicted the defendants, Bobby N. Robbins and Jimmy L. Crapps, for possession of heroin with intent to distribute,
conspiracy to distribute heroin, conspiracy to possess cocaine, and possession[407 Mass. 148] of cocaine. Prior to trial, each defendant filed a motion
to suppress evidence seized by the police from a silver Cadillac automobile in
the early morning hours of
After
hearing, the judge found the following facts.
At approximately
Robbins,
the driver, said he did not have a license, and never had one. He removed the registration from the glove
compartment. It revealed that the
Cadillac automobile was registered to Crapps, the
passenger. Crapps
produced a valid license. Robbins told
the trooper he was driving because Crapps felt too
ill to drive.
The
trooper returned to his car for a records check. The check revealed that there were no
outstanding warrants for Crapps and that the
registration was correct. The trooper
also learned that there was an outstanding warrant for Robbins and that his
license had been suspended. Sansoucy called for assistance and within a few minutes
Trooper Theodore B. Condon arrived.
The two
troopers then approached the Cadillac automobile, each on a different side of
the automobile. Sansoucy
went to the driver's side and ordered Robbins to get out of the
automobile. After a "patdown," Robbins was arrested for operating after
suspension of his license and on the outstandingwarrant. [407
Mass. 149] Robbins was handcuffed and placed in the back
seat of Sansoucy's cruiser. Sansoucy gave Robbins
the warnings required by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966), and satisfied himself that Robbins understood the warnings. (FN2)
Robbins then told Sansoucy that he and Crapps drove to New Jersey to see Crapps's
ill brother. However, Robbins could not
give Crapps's brother's name or the name of the New
Jersey town where Crapps's brother lived.
Sansoucy determined that Crapps
could leave and returned to the passenger side of the automobile, where Condon
was standing to see whether Crapps was well enough to
drive. At the vehicle, Condon told Sansoucy that he had seen a brown‑handled object
(FN3) wedged into a crack in the cushion of the front seat in the area between
the passenger seat where Crapps was sitting and the driver's
seat. Condon thought the brown‑handled
object was a weapon.
The
troopers ordered Crapps out of the Cadillac. Crapps
cooperated; he got out and went to the
rear of the automobile. Sansoucy then went to the driver's side of the
automobile with a lit flashlight. He
opened the door of the automobile to check on the brown‑handled
object. On opening the door, Sansoucy saw a glass tube protruding from under the
driver's seat. He removed the glass tube
from the automobile. The glass tube was
white at the top and blackened toward the bottom and had a wire mesh attached
to the top. Sansoucy
knew from his experience as a drug officer that the glass tube was a
"crack" cooker. (FN4) As Sansoucy removed
the glass tube, he saw and also removed a single‑edged razor blade from
under the driver's seat. Sansoucy continued to investigate the brown‑handled
object wedged in the front seat and removed it.
The object was a nine‑inch serrated knife [407 Mass. 150] with a
brown handle. At that point, Crapps also was arrested.
The
troopers made a brief inventory search according to State police policy and
made arrangements to have the Cadillac towed.
Condon went to the passenger side of the front seat and found another
"crack" cooker. The troopers
then recited the Miranda warnings to Crapps. See note 2, supra. Crapps
told the officers that he went to New Jersey to visit his sick brother. He also could not tell the officers his
brother's name or the name of the town in New Jersey where his brother lived.
After the
troopers took Crapps and Robbins to the station, Sansoucy applied for a warrant to search the
automobile. Based on what they already
had found, the officers obtained a search warrant. In the course of executing the warrant, the
officers found sixty‑eight glassine packets containing heroin.
The judge
ruled that "[t]he existence of a weapon near Crapps
could have constituted a danger, but that danger ceased when Crapps got out of the vehicle and went to its
rear...." He concluded that it was not
illegal to have a bread knife in the automobile and noted that "[n]o
threat was ever made." Crapps, like Robbins, was "cooperative" and
"[b]oth ... were removed from the knife where a
danger might have existed."
(FN5) The judge concluded that Sansoucy's action in opening the door of the vehicle which
produced the first "crack" cooker was unjustified and that the items
found thereafter were all based on the unjustified opening of the vehicle
door. He ordered all the evidence found
in the automobile suppressed. The
Commonwealth appealed. We reverse.
The
Commonwealth does not contend that the original stop permitted a search for the
purpose of seizing "fruits, instrumentalities, contraband and or other
evidence of the [407 Mass. 151] crime for which an arrest [had] been
made." G.L.
c. 276, § 1 (1988 ed.). The Commonwealth
also does not contest the principle that, because the initial search was made
without a warrant, it has the burden of proving the reasonableness of the
search.
Commonwealth v. Sumerlin, 393 Mass. 127,
128‑129 n. 1, 469 N.E.2d 826 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193, 105 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed.2d 975 (1985); Commonwealth v. Antobenedetto, 366 Mass. 51, 57, 315 N.E.2d 530
(1974). Rather, the Commonwealth argues
that the initial search was a reasonably necessary lawful protective
search. We agree.
"Our
appellate function requires that we make our own independent determination on
the correctness of the judge's 'application of constitutional principles to the
facts as found....' " Commonwealth
v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 550, 369 N.E.2d 692 (1977), quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 403,
97 S.Ct. 1232, 1242, 51 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977), quoting
the separate opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 507, 73 S.Ct.
397, 446, 97 L.Ed. 469 (1953). Applying constitutional principles to the
instant case, we conclude that the evidence should not have been
suppressed. "We believe the
circumstances [in these cases] justified the [trooper's] actions." Commonwealth v. Sumerlin,
supra 393 Mass. at 129, 469 N.E.2d 826.
"[T]he
issue is whether a reasonably prudent [person] in the circumstances would be
warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger."
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049‑1050, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3480‑3481, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983),
quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1883, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The defendants do not contest the judge's
implicit ruling that the stop was justified.
"If the stop was justified, the officers could take reasonable
precautions for their own protection.
Such precautions may include ordering occupants out of a car for
questioning. Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 111, 98 S.Ct. 330, 333, 54 L.Ed.2d 331
(1977). They also may include a search extending
into the interior of an automobile, but they are 'confined to what is minimally
necessary to learn whether the suspect is armed and to disarm him once the
weapon is discovered.' " Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 376 [407 Mass. 152] Mass. 502, 505, 381 N.E.2d 141 (1978), quoting Commonwealth v. Almeida, 373 Mass. 266,
272, 366 N.E.2d 756 (1977). (FN6)
In the
present case, while standing outside the vehicle, the troopers clearly saw the
brown‑handled object wedged in the front seat, where Crapps
was seated on the passenger side. It was
late at night. Crapps's
companion had just been arrested on an outstanding warrant and had given the
officers an unlikely explanation of the two men's activities that evening. Before letting Crapps
move to the driver's side where he would have had control over the vehicle and
the object, the troopers could order him out of the vehicle. They then could determine whether the object
wedged in the front seat was, in fact, a weapon which could be used against
them. The troopers were not required to
gamble with their personal safety.
"[A] Terry type of search may extend into
the interior of an automobile so long as it is limited in scope to a protective
end." Commonwealth v. Almeida, 373 Mass. 266,
272, 366 N.E.2d 756 (1977). We believe
the investigation of the object wedged in the front seat and clearly visible
from outside the automobile was limited to a protective end and permitted the
trooper to open the automobile door. The
search in this case was confined to what was minimally necessary to learn
whether the object wedged in the front seat was, in fact, a weapon. With the door open, the "crack"
cooker was immediately visible. It is
irrelevant that the object turned out to be a knife that was legal to
possess. The issue is the reasonableness
of the troopers' action in initiating the limited search.
The order
suppressing the evidence is reversed, and the cases are remanded to the
Superior Court for trial.
So ordered.
(FN1.) Four indictments against Jimmy L. Crapps and three against Bobby N. Robbins.
(FN2.)
Because he suppressed the evidence, the judge did not address the adequacy of
the Miranda warnings and waivers. No
issues concerning either the warnings or the waivers are before us.
(FN3.)
The record describes the object, interchangeably, as brown‑handled or
wooden‑handled.
(FN4.)
Both "crack" cookers contained residue of cocaine.
(FN5.)
The judge correctly determined that Robbins, as well as Crapps,
had standing to object to the search.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Amendola,
406 Mass. 592, 596‑601, 550 N.E.2d 121 (1990). See also Commonwealth v. Podgurski,
386 Mass. 385, 436 N.E.2d 150 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1222, 103 S.Ct. 1167, 75 L.Ed.2d 464 (1983). The Commonwealth does not argue otherwise.
(FN6.)
The defendants also do not take issue with Trooper Sansoucy's
use of a flashlight. See Commonwealth v. Cavanaugh, 366 Mass.
277, 281, 317 N.E.2d 480 (1974).