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Opinions of The and the Court of Appeals To be used in
conjunction with the CPS Criminal Procedure Textbook |
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CPS Commonwealth
Police Service, Inc. and the Law Office of Patrick Michael Rogers |
Commonwealth v. Moschella,
11 Mass.App.Ct. 1021 (1981)
Appeals Court of Massachusetts,
Argued
Decided
Sherrill P. Cline, Somerville, for defendant.
M. Catherine Huddleson,
Sp. Asst. Dist. Atty. (David Marsh, Legal
Asst. to the Dist. Atty., with her), for the Commonwealth.
Before BROWN, CUTTER and KASS,
JJ.
RESCRIPT.
This is an
interlocutory appeal from the denial of the defendant's pretrial motion to
suppress certain illegal drugs and an unlicensed firearm.
(1) It is
unnecessary for us to decide whether the information received from the so‑called
reliable police informant could constitute probable cause to arrest (see Beck
v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S.Ct. 223, 225, 13
L.Ed.2d 142 (1964)), as we conclude [11
Mass.App.Ct. 1022]
that the defendant was properly arrested and the evidence sought to be
suppressed was properly seized incident to that arrest.
Prior to
the arrest the police saw the defendant place a weapon under the front seat of
his automobile. This observation thereby
entitled the police to seize the defendant on the spot. Commonwealth v. Ballou,
350
(2) We
conclude that the circumstances reasonably warranted "the interference
with the defendant's freedom which resulted from the ... (blocking) of ...
(his) motor vehicle." Commonwealth
v. Riggins, 366 Mass. 81, 86, 315 N.E.2d 525 (1974). See Commonwealth v. Cantalupo,
‑‑‑ Mass. ‑‑‑, ‑‑‑ n.1,
([FNB]) 402 N.E.2d 1040 (1980), and cases cited
therein.
The
officers had sufficient justification to make an investigatory stop. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145‑147,
92 S.Ct. 1921, 1922‑1923, 32 L.Ed.2d 612
(1972). See also United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, ‑‑‑, 101 S.Ct.
690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). The
informer had told the officers that the defendant had cocaine in his possession
and was also carrying a firearm. See
Commonwealth v. Cantalupo, supra at 1040 ‑ ‑‑‑,
402 N.E.2d 1040, ([FNC]) and cases cited. Contrast Sibron v.
New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62‑63, 88 S.Ct. 1889,
1902‑1903, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968).
When the officers' personal knowledge is coupled with the informer's
quite specific tip (which was corroborated in substantial part), it cannot be
said that the officers lacked "specific and articulable
facts" (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct.
1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)), from which they could reasonably infer in
light of their experience that the defendant was engaged in or about to engage
in criminal conduct. Contrast Reid v.
Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, ‑‑‑, 100 S.Ct.
2752, 2754, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980); Commonwealth v. Bacon, ‑‑‑
Mass. ‑‑‑, ‑‑‑ ‑ ‑‑‑,
([FND]) 411 N.E.2d 772 (1980).
We need
not decide whether the police could have effected a constitutionally
permissible arrest of the defendant if they had not observed the weapon in the
defendant's hand.
Order
affirmed.
FNa. Mass.App.Ct.Adv.Sh.
(1980) 1241.
(FNB.) Mass.Adv.Sh. (1980) 741, 744 n.1.
(FNC.) Mass.Adv.Sh. (1980) at 743‑744.
(FND.) Mass.Adv.Sh. (1980) 2223, 2226‑2227.