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Opinions of The and the Court of Appeals To be used in
conjunction with the CPS Criminal Procedure Textbook |
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CPS Commonwealth
Police Service, Inc. and the Law Office of Patrick Michael Rogers |
Commonwealth v. Magee, 423
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Argued
Decided
Martin F. Murphy, Assistant District Attorney, for
Commonwealth.
Tamar Augst,
Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, LYNCH, O'CONNOR
and GREANEY, JJ.
LYNCH, Justice.
This case
is before the court on an interlocutory appeal from an order by a Superior
Court judge suppressing certain statements made by the defendant, Joyce J.
Magee, to law enforcement officials.
After hearing testimony from several witnesses, the judge ordered the
statements suppressed on the grounds that:
(1) the defendant's waiver of her
Miranda rights was not valid and (2) the statements were not
voluntary. The Commonwealth was granted
leave to appeal from the order of the Superior Court, pursuant to
Mass.R.Crim.P.[423
1. Facts.
We summarize the motion judge's findings of fact: Late in the evening of
When they
arrived at the police station at about
McNiff
asked the defendant whether she wanted to talk;
the defendant nodded her head.
(FN3) McNiff brought the
defendant to a small office in the police station (FN4); at the defendant's request, Montmarquet
joined her there. McNiff read the
defendant her Miranda rights and she
orally agreed to waive them. When
advised of her right to have an attorney present, the defendant responded that
she did not know any attorney to call or how to get one to the police station
at that hour. McNiff responded by
stating that she could call anyone she wished.
McNiff
then questioned the defendant. During
the interview,[423 Mass. 383]
the defendant repeatedly asked for help and to be committed. McNiff understood her to be asking for the
help of a trained mental health professional.
In response to these requests, McNiff told the defendant that she would
get help if she explained what she needed and what the problem was. In the course of the questioning, the
defendant spoke about the circumstances leading up to the death of her son in 1988,
and she indicated that it may not have been caused by SIDS. When pressed for the details of her
involvement in the child's death, the defendant repeatedly refused to answer
McNiff's questions. She said that, if
she told the police what she thought had happened, they would arrest her. Throughout the interview with McNiff, the
defendant was exhausted, emotionally distraught, and disheveled, and her
responses to questions were interrupted by periods of sobbing and shaking.
At about
5:50 A.M., Dracut Detective James Wagner arrived to continue the
questioning. He was informed that the
defendant was seeking help and that she was upset about the death of her son in
1988. Wagner administered a second set
of Miranda warnings at about 6
A.M.; at that time, the defendant
signed a form acknowledging that she waived her rights. Wagner conducted his interview of the
defendant in the same room where McNiff's interview had occurred. Present were the defendant, Montmarquet,
McNiff, and Wagner. Wagner's questioning
focused on the defendant's role in her son's death. The defendant continued to refuse to answer
questions about her direct involvement.
She also continued to ask for help in being involuntarily committed to a
mental health facility. She continued to
look distraught and disheveled, with periods of sobbing and shaking.
After
about twenty‑five more minutes of questioning, McNiff and Wagner told the
defendant they had called for assistance, and asked the defendant and
Montmarquet to wait until the additional people arrived. The defendant and Montmarquet were offered
food and coffee, and accepted coffee. At
about 9 A.M., State Trooper Owen Boyle arrived, along with an assistant district
attorney. (FN5) Boyle was briefed by McNiff and Wagner about
the morning's events and the defendant's statements regarding the death of her
son and her request for help.
[423 Mass. 384] During the next two hours, Boyle questioned the defendant regarding
the death of her son. The questioning
took place in the same office as the prior interviews, with Montmarquet,
McNiff, and Wagner present. In response
to the defendant's requests for help, Boyle said he would help with her
problem, but that he needed more information before he could do so. During the interview with Boyle, the
defendant was tense and distraught, although her forceful crying had stopped.
Miranda warnings were administered at
some time after Boyle began questioning the defendant. During the questioning, the defendant
eventually stated that she believed she had suffocated her child. Boyle typed the substance of the statement
onto his computer and printed it out for the defendant to sign. She looked over the three pages, made minor
corrections and then signed the statement.
By then it was noon. After the
defendant signed the statement, she was told that arrangements had been made
for a mental health evaluation at Solomon Mental Health Center in Lowell
(Solomon). Montmarquet then drove the
defendant to Solomon, with police following.
The duty
nurse at Solomon noted that the defendant was distraught and disheveled on
arrival, that her eyes were red, indicating prolonged crying, that she was
crying, at times forcefully, and was suffering from lack of sleep. The defendant told the nurse that she had no
memory of actually asphyxiating her son but that she felt responsible for his
death. Based on the defendant's extreme
level of distress and her suicidal ideation, she was involuntarily committed to
Anna Jacques Hospital in Newburyport. A
few days later, Dracut police arrested her there, and charged her with the
murder of her son.
[1] 2.
Standard of review. The
motion judge granted the defendant's motion to suppress her statements to the
police principally because the Commonwealth failed to sustain its heavy burden
that the defendant's waiver of her
Miranda rights was voluntary and that the defendant's statements were
voluntary. In reviewing the judge's
action, we "accept[ ] the judge's subsidiary findings of fact
absent clear error, give[ ] substantial deference to the judge's ultimate
findings and conclusions of law, but independently review[ ] the correctness of
the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts found."
Commonwealth v. Mello, 420 Mass. 375, [423 Mass. 385] 381 n.
8, 649 N.E.2d 1106 (1995). See Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410,
412‑413, 492 N.E.2d 74 (1986).
[2][3][4]
3.
Custody. "Miranda warnings are only necessary for
'custodial interrogation.' " Commonwealth v. Jung, 420 Mass. 675, 688,
651 N.E.2d 1211 (1995), quoting Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694
(1966). Therefore, before asking whether
the defendant's waiver of Miranda
rights was valid, we must determine whether
Miranda warnings were necessary at all.
Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.,
quoting Miranda v. Arizona, supra. The following factors are relevant in
determining whether custodial interrogation has occurred: "(1) the place of the
interrogation; (2) whether the
investigation has begun to focus on the suspect, including whether there is
probable cause to arrest the suspect; (FN6) (3) the nature of the
interrogation, including whether the interview was aggressive or, instead,
informal and influenced in its contours by the suspect; and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating
statement was made, the suspect was free to end the interview by leaving the
locus of the interrogation or by asking the interrogator to leave, as evidenced
by whether the interview terminated with the defendant's arrest." Id.
at 688, 651 N.E.2d 1211, quoting
Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 737, 459 N.E.2d 792 (1984).
[5] Here,
the defendant was interrogated while in police custody and therefore Miranda warnings were required. The defendant was interviewed in a closed
room at a police station by a succession of three law enforcement officers over
a period of approximately seven hours.
The questions focused almost exclusively on her possible criminal
involvement in the death of her son in 1988.
She was never told she could leave, and was told at least once to wait
for the next officer to arrive. On
several occasions she told her interrogators that, if she told them everything,
she would be arrested. Throughout the
interviews, she sought help in being committed to a mental facility, and was
repeatedly told that she would not receive that help until she answered the
interrogators' questions. Together,
these facts support the judge's finding that the defendant[423 Mass. 386] was in custody. See
Commonwealth v. Damiano, 422 Mass. 10, 13, 660 N.E.2d 660 (1996);
Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 402 Mass. 275, 277‑278, 521 N.E.2d
1368 (1988).
The
Commonwealth argues that other facts indicate that the defendant was not in
custody. They point to the defendant's
voluntary arrival at the police station, her agreement to talk to police, the
presence of Montmarquet throughout the interviews, and the fact that the
defendant left the station with Montmarquet without having been arrested. The Commonwealth also notes that the
defendant was offered food and coffee, and that she was not verbally or
physically threatened or abused by the officers. While the Commonwealth concedes that the
defendant was never told she could leave, it emphasizes that she was never told
she could not leave. None of these factors is dispositive,
however, and must be viewed in light of the entire set of circumstances. On balance, these facts do not require us to
reject the judge's finding. Cf. Commonwealth v. Buckley, 410 Mass. 209,
217‑218, 571 N.E.2d 609 (1991); Commonwealth v. Harris, 387 Mass. 758,
765, 443 N.E.2d 1287 (1982).
[6][7][8][9]
4.
Waiver of Miranda rights.
The defendant argues that her waiver of Miranda rights was invalid.
We agree. "The Commonwealth
bears the burden of proving the validity of a Miranda waiver beyond a reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420 Mass. 666, 669, 651 N.E.2d 398 (1995). "To be valid the waiver must be made
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Id. at 670, 651 N.E.2d
398. "In determining whether a
waiver was made voluntarily, the court must examine the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the making of the waiver." Id.
The
defendant's waiver of her right to remain silent and her right to counsel did
not meet the above standard. First, it
is relevant that the police failed scrupulously to honor those rights. See
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 377 Mass. 319, 326, 386 N.E.2d 15 (1979). Cf.
Commonwealth v. Pennellatore, 392 Mass. 382, 387, 467 N.E.2d 820
(1984). (FN7) Although the defendant refused on several occasions
to answer questions regarding her specific involvement in the death of her
child, the questioning continued. When
told of her right to have an attorney present during the [423 Mass. 387]
questioning, the defendant said she did not know any attorneys and wondered how
she could get an attorney to the police station at that hour on the Fourth of
July. We agree with the motion judge
that McNiff's response‑‑to point to the telephone and tell the
defendant she could call anyone she wanted‑‑was "less than
adequate." See Commonwealth v. Hosey, 368 Mass. 571, 578, 334 N.E.2d 44 (1975) (Miranda waiver was invalid where police
put burden on defendant to insist on lawyer).
[10]
Second, the defendant's physical and emotional condition indicates that the waiver
was not knowing or voluntary. See Commonwealth v. Koney, 421 Mass. 295,
304‑305, 657 N.E.2d 210 (1995).
The record supports the judge's finding that the defendant was suffering
from lack of sleep and that she had been emotionally distraught throughout the
entire interrogation period, with a number of episodes of forceful crying and
uncontrollable shaking. Third, the
physical location of the interrogations (in a closed police station office, in
the presence of as many as three officers at one time), their timing (in the
early morning hours after a sleepless night) and length (seven hours), created
a coercive environment which made it more difficult for the defendant to act
rationally in protecting her rights. Finally,
the promise of the officers that, if the defendant would give them the
information they wanted, she would receive the psychological help she was
seeking, established a quid pro quo situation which certainly affected the
defendant's capacity for a knowing and voluntary waiver. (FN8)
For all these reasons, we see no basis to interfere with the judge's
ruling that the defendant's waiver of her
Miranda rights was not voluntary.
See Commonwealth v. Meehan,
377 Mass. 552, 567‑568, 387 N.E.2d 527 (1979), cert. dismissed, 445 U.S.
39, 100 S.Ct. 1092, 63 L.Ed.2d 185 (1980); Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra at 329,
386 N.E.2d 15.
[11][12][13][14]
5. Voluntariness of the defendant's
statements. Due process requires a
separate inquiry into the voluntariness of the statement, apart from the validity
of the Miranda waiver.
Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra at 673, 651 N.E.2d 398. See
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169‑170, 107 S.Ct. 515, 522‑23,
93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). In this
determination, we [423 Mass. 388] look at the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the making of the statement, "to ensure that the defendant's
confession was a free and voluntary act and was not the product of
inquisitorial activity which had overborne [her] will."
Commonwealth v. Mahnke, 368 Mass. 662, 680, 335 N.E.2d 660 (1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959, 96 S.Ct. 1740, 48 L.Ed.2d 204 (1976). "Relevant factors include, but are not
limited to, 'promises or other inducements, conduct of the defendant, the
defendant's age, education, intelligence and emotional stability, experience
with and in the criminal justice system, physical and mental condition, the
initiator of the discussion of a deal or leniency (whether the defendant
or the police), and the details of the interrogation, including the recitation
of Miranda warnings.' "
Commonwealth v. Selby, 420 Mass. 656, 663, 651 N.E.2d 843 (1995),
quoting Commonwealth v. Mandile, supra
at 413, 492 N.E.2d 74.
The
circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement support the judge's
finding that the statement was not voluntary.
In particular, the promise that the defendant would receive the medical
treatment she consistently requested, in return for her statement to the police
regarding her involvement in the death of her child, constituted a form of
psychological coercion which, in view of the defendant's debilitated physical
and emotional state and the physical and temporal circumstances of the
interrogations, rendered the statements involuntary. See
O'Tinger v. State, 342 So.2d 1343, 1345‑1346 (Ala.Crim.App.1977)
(withholding requested medical treatment until defendant confessed rendered
confession involuntary); People v. Hogan, 31 Cal.3d 815, 838‑839,
841, 183 Cal.Rptr. 817, 647 P.2d 93 (1982) (promising defendant that he would
receive psychological help if he confessed rendered confession involuntary),
overruled on other grounds, People v.
Cooper, 53 Cal.3d 771, 836, 281 Cal.Rptr. 90, 809 P.2d 865, cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1016, 112 S.Ct. 664, 116 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991); State v. Allies, 186 Mont.
99, 112‑115, 606 P.2d 1043 (1979) (leading defendant to believe that
confessing would allow him to get psychological help rendered confession
involuntary). See also United States v. Wauneka, 842 F.2d
1083, 1088 (9th Cir.1988) (threat to withhold medical care from defendant's
pregnant girl friend, if proved, would have raised colorable claim of
psychological coercion); Miller v. Fenton, 741 F.2d 1456, 1467 n.
21 (3d Cir.1984) ("if [police] questioning had in fact induced [the
defendant] to confess in the belief that [she] would receive psychological
'help' rather than punishment, the confession [423 Mass. 389] would
not be 'voluntary' "), rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 104, 106 S.Ct.
445, 88 L.Ed.2d 405 (1985).
Our recent
cases involving police deception are not to the contrary. See
Commonwealth v. Edwards, supra at 674, 651 N.E.2d 398; Commonwealth v. Selby, supra
at 665, 651 N.E.2d 843. In those cases,
we concluded that police deception regarding the facts of a particular crime or
the existence of evidence linking the defendant to the crime did not, by
itself, render a confession involuntary.
Here, the police did not deceive the defendant regarding the death of
her son or about any other crime they suspected her of committing. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Selby, supra at 664, 651 N.E.2d 843. Instead, they withheld the medical treatment
she had requested until she provided them with a statement about her
involvement in the death of her son.
Once the defendant provided a signed statement, the police provided her
with access to a mental health facility.
Given all the other circumstances of the defendant's seven‑hour
stay at the police station, particularly her lack of sleep and unstable
emotional state, there is significant support for the judge's conclusion. See
Commonwealth v. Meehan, supra at 568, 387 N.E.2d 527; Commonwealth v. Hosey, supra;
Commonwealth v. Scherben, 28 Mass.App.Ct. 952, 953, 550 N.E.2d 899
(1990). Cf. Commonwealth v. L'Abbe, 421 Mass. 262, 270, 656 N.E.2d 1242
(1995).
6. Conclusion. We therefore affirm the motion judge's
conclusions that the Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden on the issues of
the validity of defendant's waiver of
Miranda rights and the voluntariness of the defendant's statement. Accordingly, we affirm the order allowing the
defendant's motion to suppress.
So ordered.
(FN1.) At the time, the death had been
attributed to sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS).
(FN2.)
They decided to go to Dracut instead of Lowell because the defendant had lived
in Dracut in 1988 when her child had died.
(FN3.)
To the extent that the judge found that the defendant explicitly stated that
she did not want to talk with the police, that finding is not supported by the
record.
(FN4.)
Although the judge made no findings regarding the specific characteristics of
the room, the undisputed testimony of one of the officers indicates that it was
twelve feet by twenty feet in area and contained several desks and chairs, and
at least one window.
(FN5.)
The judge found that the assistant district attorney did not participate in the
questioning of the defendant.
(FN6.) But cf. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, ‑‑‑‑,
114 S.Ct. 1526, 1530, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) ("any inquiry into whether
the interrogating officers have focused their suspicions upon the individual
being questioned [assuming those suspicions remain undisclosed] is not relevant
for purposes of Miranda ").
(FN7.) Because we conclude that the
defendant's waiver of her Miranda
rights was invalid, we need not consider whether the police were required to
stop questioning her because she had invoked her right to remain silent. Cf.
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, ‑‑‑‑ ‑ ‑‑‑‑,
114 S.Ct. 2350, 2355‑2356, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994).
(FN8.) The Commonwealth points in part to the
written waiver as evidence that the defendant acted voluntarily. While such a writing is some evidence, it is
not dispositive. See Commonwealth v. Philip S., 414 Mass. 804, 813 n. 7, 611 N.E.2d 226
(1993). We still must analyze the
totality of the circumstances to determine the validity of a Miranda waiver.