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Opinions of The and the Court of Appeals To be used in
conjunction with the CPS Criminal Procedure Textbook |
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CPS Commonwealth
Police Service, Inc. and the Law Office of Patrick Michael Rogers |
Commonwealth v. Leonard, 401
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampshire.
Argued
Decided
William C. Newman (Steven C. Schlang,
Charles K. Stephenson, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.
Before HENNESSEY, C.J.,
and LIACOS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.
LIACOS, Justice.
The
defendant, Robert W. Leonard, appeals from a conviction by a jury of six on a
complaint for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
intoxicating liquor. G.L.
c. 90, § 24 (1986 ed.). He appeals,
claiming error on three grounds: (1) The
trial judge improperly refused to rule on the defendant's motion to suppress
his statements to the investigating police officers; (2) the judge failed to make a finding that
his statements to the police officers were voluntary prior to allowing evidence
of them to be submitted to the jury; and
(3) the judge erred in denying the defendant's motion for a [401 Mass. 471]
required finding of not guilty. We
transferred the case here on our own motion. We decide the appeal on the last allegation
of error and, thus, do not consider the first two allegations. We conclude that there was insufficient evidence
to warrant submission of the case to the jury;
hence, we set aside the judgment and remand the case for entry of a
judgment of acquittal.
At trial,
the defendant conceded that he was intoxicated and that Route 91 is a public
way. Both parties agree that the only
issue contested was whether the defendant had been operating the vehicle. The facts adduced at trial with regard to the
operation of the vehicle are these. On
the evening of
Beckley
and Trooper John F. Keenan, Jr., testified that, when Keenan arrived at the
scene, the defendant was sitting in the front seat of the automobile with his
wife on his lap. The defendant was
trying to put the key in the ignition, and his wife was struggling to stop
him. The troopers physically removed the
defendant from the automobile and placed him in protective custody in Trooper
Keenan's vehicle. The defendant's wife
asked for her cigarettes, and they were retrieved from the floor on the
passenger side of the automobile.
Trooper
Keenan drove the defendant to the Northampton State police barracks and, while
en route, gave him Miranda warnings. The
defendant indicated that he understood the rights. Keenan then asked the defendant what had
happened that evening. The defendant
said that he had picked up his wife at her place of employment and, while he
was driving, their argument commenced.
[401 Mass. 472] The defendant did not testify.
His wife, then estranged from the defendant, testified that she had been
driving and that it was her vehicle.
Trooper Peter Higgins was called on rebuttal, and he testified that Mrs.
Leonard had indicated previously that the defendant had been driving. This testimony was admitted solely for the
impeachment of Mrs. Leonard's testimony.
The only
evidence on the contested issue of operation in this case was the defendant's
admissions to Keenan and Higgins that he was driving. These statements were made while the
defendant was highly intoxicated. There
was also evidence that the defendant was not arrested at the scene for driving
under the influence. While being booked
at the Northampton State police barracks, he denied that he was the operator of
the vehicle.
The
testimony of Mrs. Leonard also indicated that she had not consumed any
alcoholic beverage, (FN1) that the defendant came to her place of employment
shortly before the incident on Route 91, and that she refused to let him drive
because he was greatly intoxicated.
Further, she testified that he became agitated while they were traveling
in the vehicle, and that he did physical damage to the vehicle before she had
pulled over to the side of the road. The
interior physical damage to the vehicle corroborated her testimony, as it was
largely on the passenger side.
The
defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at the close of the
Commonwealth's case and when he rested.
The motions were denied. Posttrial motions for a new trial and for reconsideration
also were denied.
In
Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453, 457,
466 N.E.2d 510 (1984), we stated, as to an extrajudicial confession, that we
would adopt the majority rule of this nation that an uncorroborated confession
is "insufficient to prove guilt."
We indicated our view that "the majority rule has much to commend
it, in that it precludes the possibility of conviction of crime based solely on
statements made by a person suffering a mental or emotional
disturbance or some other aberration." Id.
The "statements" of [401
Mass. 473] the defendant in this
case fall short of being a confession of all the elements of guilt but are
admissions pertaining to the only contested issue. That Route 91 was a public way was
stipulated. That the defendant was
highly intoxicated was shown by the evidence of both the prosecution and the
defendant. This fact was not
contested. (FN2)
The only
contested issue of fact was whether he had operated the vehicle. Apart from his statements, there was no such
evidence. The Commonwealth claims that
his demand that his wife "give ... back" the keys, together with the
wife's cigarettes being found on the floor of the passenger side of the front
compartment, suffice to corroborate the defendant's statements. We are unpersuaded. The inference to be drawn from the location
of the cigarettes is speculative, especially since there was a struggle inside
the vehicle. The defendant's demand that
his wife "give ... back" the keys is ambiguous and speculative also,
in light of the fact that the defendant had been allowed to operate the vehicle
earlier in the day.
Returning
to Forde,
we noted that the corroborative evidence we would require is "some
evidence, besides the confession, that the criminal act was committed by
someone, that is, that the crime was real and not imaginary." Id.
at 458, 466 N.E.2d 510. There was no
such evidence in this case. Thus, it was
error to deny the defendant's motions for a required finding of not guilty.
Judgment reversed.
Verdict set aside.
Judgment for the defendant.
(FN1.) There was no evidence to contradict
this testimony.
(FN2.)
There also was evidence that the defendant was highly agitated, that he had
assaulted his wife, that he had threatened both the State troopers and
bystanders seeking to give assistance, and that he had climbed on the hood of
the vehicle and had shattered the windshield.