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Opinions of The and the Court of Appeals To be used in
conjunction with the CPS Criminal Procedure Textbook |
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CPS Commonwealth
Police Service, Inc. and the Law Office of Patrick Michael Rogers |
Commonwealth v. Jeffers, 27 Mass.App.Ct.
1162 (1989)
Appeals Court of Massachusetts,
No. 88‑P‑854.
Argued
Decided
[27 Mass.App.Ct.
1164] Mary O'Sullivan Smith, Asst.
Dist. Atty., for the Com.
Lee J. Fortier,
Joan McDonough,
Before GREANEY, C.J., and CUTTER and PERRETTA, JJ.
RESCRIPT.
This is an
authorized interlocutory appeal by the Commonwealth from orders of the Superior
Court suppressing evidence seized during a warrantless
search of the defendants' apartment. The
judge made findings of fact upon which he concluded that, although the police
were justified in entering the apartment, they were without justification to
search it. On the facts found we
conclude that the Commonwealth sustained its burden of showing the existence of
exigent circumstances which excused the failure to obtain a warrant. We reverse.
1. We
recite the facts as the judge found them.
About
About five
officers and the victim went to the apartment building. Two of the officers remained outside, and the
others went with the victim to the second floor of the building. One of the officers knocked on the door
indicated by the victim and announced himself as an officer. When Jeffers opened the door, the victim
immediately identified her. The officers
entered the apartment and quickly went into the rooms looking for the two male
assailants. As they were passing from
room to room, they saw a white male in a drunken, unconscious state on a couch
and five children ranging in ages from thirteen to two years.
Moments
after the police entered the apartment, they received a radio call from the two
officers who had remained outside. They
were chasing two men who had just run out of the building. The officers in the apartment ran out to join
the chase, which lasted less than a minute. The men were caught, and the victim identified
them as his assailants. The officers
searched the area of the chase and the grounds near the building, but they
could not find the gun.
Jeffers
was now standing in front of the building.
When the officers arrested her, she asked if she could go back to her
apartment, get a coat, and say good‑bye to her children. Three of the officers accompanied Jeffers to
her apartment where the white male and the five children had remained [27 Mass.App.Ct.
1163] during the pursuit. One of the officers was placed in charge of
the children while the other two began to look for the gun. Although the police had called the Department
of Social Services (department), they allowed the thirteen‑year‑old
boy to leave. The gun, which turned out
to be a toy rather than an actual firearm, was found in a partially opened
drawer in the room where the victim had been robbed.
When the
officers found the gun, they immediately stopped their search of the apartment,
and two of them left. The other remained
with the four children until a representative from the department arrived a
short time later.
On these
facts the judge concluded: (1) that the
officers were justified in entering the apartment; (2) that they were not reasonable in
believing that an emergency situation presenting a threat to them or the
occupants of the apartment existed; and
(3) that even if an emergency existed, the officers could have secured the
apartment and the children while making arrangements to obtain a warrant.
[1] 2.
Giving the judge's ultimate findings and conclusions substantial deference (see Commonwealth v. Harvey, 390 Mass. 203,
205, 454 N.E.2d 105 [1983], and cases therein cited), we nonetheless conclude
that the Commonwealth sustained its burden of proof. See
Commonwealth v. Hall, 366 Mass. 790, 801‑802, 323 N.E.2d 319 (1975);
Commonwealth v. Forde, 367 Mass. 798, 800,
329 N.E.2d 717 (1975); Commonwealth v. Donoghue,
23 Mass. App.Ct. 103, 108, 499 N.E.2d 832
(1986). We use the "pragmatic check
list of factors," Commonwealth v. DiSanto,
8 Mass. App.Ct. 694, 700, 397 N.E.2d 672 (1979),
which serves as a guideline in determining whether an exigency existed. See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 24 Mass. App.Ct. 290, 293, 508 N.E.2d 870 (1987). Further, we evaluate the circumstances as they
"could appear to the officers at the time, not as it may seem to a scholar
after the event with the benefit of leisured retrospective analysis."
Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. 448, 456, 416 N.E.2d 944 (1981).
Those
factors enumerated in DiSanto,
supra, as (1), (2), (3), and (6), exist in the present case. When the officers in the apartment ran
outside to join in the chase of the two men, leaving Jeffers, the unconscious
man, and the five children behind, it would not be unreasonable for them to have
thought that the fleeing men had the gun.
When they could not find the gun in the area of the chase and the
building, it was also reasonable to think that it was in the apartment with the
inebriated man and the five children.
[2] That
the officers, who now had custody of the two men and Jeffers, could have
"secured" the apartment, the man passed out on the couch, and the
five children for the length of time it might take to obtain a warrant from a
magistrate at that hour on New Year's Day seems a rather unlikely proposition
to us. But, assuming that the officers
could have done so, their failure to take those measures does not make their
actions unreasonable. See Commonwealth v. Forde,
367 Mass. at 802‑803, 329 N.E.2d 717; Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. at 459‑460,
416 N.E.2d 944; Commonwealth v. Donoghue,
23 Mass. App.Ct. at 108‑109, 499 N.E.2d
832. The officers had called the
Department of Social [27 Mass.App.Ct. 1164]
Services, and all but one of them left the apartment as soon as the gun was
found. The remaining officer left when a
representative from the department arrived.
[3] We
view the fact that the thirteen‑year‑old boy was allowed to leave
the apartment before the gun was found and before the arrival of the
department's representative as unwise in respect to the child's welfare rather than
as an action which "negates the existence of exigency." Id.
at 109, 499 N.E.2d 832. On the facts
found by the judge, we conclude that the police acted reasonably and under
exigent circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Young, 382 Mass. at 457‑458,
416 N.E.2d 944; Commonwealth v. Donoghue,
23 Mass. App.Ct. at 104‑109, 499 N.E.2d
832. Compare Commonwealth v. Huffman, 385 Mass. 122, 430 N.E.2d 1190 (1982);
Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 24 Mass. App.Ct.
at 292‑294, 508 N.E.2d 870.
Order allowing motions to suppress reversed.
(FN1.) The companion cases are against Willie
B. Jones.