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Opinions of The and the Court of Appeals To be used in
conjunction with the CPS Criminal Procedure Textbook |
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CPS Commonwealth
Police Service, Inc. and the Law Office of Patrick Michael Rogers |
Commonwealth v. Guyton, 405
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Argued
Decided
John J. Bonistalli,
Claudia R. Sullivan, Sp. Asst. Dist. Atty., for the
Com.
Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN and O'CONNOR, JJ.
O'CONNOR, Justice.
Following
a trial by jury, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and
larceny. This is an appeal from those
convictions. The defendant argues that
the trial judge erroneously denied his motion to suppress statements he gave to
the police as well as physical evidence seized pursuant to search warrants
obtained on the basis of those statements.
He also asserts that the judge erroneously admitted evidence of his
prior misconduct, and that he was deprived of the effective assistance of
counsel. Lastly, he requests that we [405
Stanley Cymbura was a newspaper vendor and he delivered newspapers
inside the building at
In
connection with his suppression motion, the defendant contends that the
Commonwealth failed to sustain its burden of showing that he waived his right
to remain silent guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The judge found the
following facts after an evidentiary hearing on the motion. On the date of the incident, the defendant
was sixteen years old and his sister, Leya‑Anne
Guyton, was seventeen. The police
visited the Guyton apartment that day and, after learning that the defendant
was out, left a telephone number for him to call when he returned. Later that day, the defendant called the
police, agreed to meet officers in front of 50 Franklin Street, and then did
so. The defendant voluntarily
accompanied the officers to his apartment which he and Leya‑Anne shared with their mother, two younger
siblings, and Leya‑Anne's infant daughter. The defendant's mother had gone to California
and had left Leya‑Anne in charge of the
apartment and with general responsibility to supervise the defendant. The defendant's father lived in Boston.
[405 Mass. 499] According to the judge's findings, an officer gave the defendant
the warnings required by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d
694 (1966), in the presence of Leya‑Anne. Leya‑Anne
said that she understood the warnings.
The defendant also said he understood them; that he had heard them all before. A detective told the defendant that a witness
had seen the defendant counting large sums of money, and that it would
"help [the defendant] out a great deal" if the money were recovered. The defendant immediately led the officers to
a bag and a box containing a large sum of money.
The
officers then told Leya‑Anne that they were
taking the defendant to the police station.
They asked her if she would accompany the defendant, and she said she
was unable to do so. On the way out of
the building, the defendant told the police he had found the money. The defendant's statement was taken at the
station. Before the statement was taken,
however, an officer telephoned Leya‑Anne
"and placed [the defendant] on another line to overhear the conversation." The officer explained to Leya‑Anne
that she wished to interrogate the defendant and the officer read the Miranda
warnings to Leya‑Anne within the defendant's
hearing. Leya‑Anne
said she understood the defendant's rights and that she did not object to the
officer's interrogating the defendant.
The defendant then signed the Miranda card and gave his statement.
The judge
also found that the defendant was in police custody from the time he met the
officers at 50 Franklin Street on the day of the incident, that the defendant
and Leya‑Anne understood the defendant's rights
under Miranda, that the defendant's
statements at 50 Franklin Street and at the police station were given by him
voluntarily, and that Leya‑Anne had consented
to the questioning of the defendant by the police. In addition, the judge found that the
defendant "prior to March 3, 1985 had extensive contact with the police
and juvenile authorities and was well aware of his Miranda rights." The judge denied the motion to suppress,
ruling as follows: "[T]he defendant
received the rights he was required to be given under the provisions of Miranda v. Arizona and in accordance
with the interested adult rule. See Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, ... 389
Mass. 128 [449 N.E.2d 654] (1983)."
[405 Mass. 500] The defendant's statements to the police, which he unsuccessfully
sought to have suppressed, including the defendant's nonverbal admission made
by his retrieving the money and giving it to the police in the apartment, were
admitted in evidence at trial as was physical evidence obtained as a result of
those statements. It is undisputed that
the police obtained a warrant to search the defendant and his apartment on the
basis of an application that recited portions of the defendant's statement at the
police station and that disclosed the large sum of money at his apartment. Pursuant to the warrant, the police seized
the defendant's sneakers and took fingernail scrapings from the defendant. At the trial, the Commonwealth introduced
evidence of blood on the sneakers and on the defendant's fingernails.
Whenever a
criminal defendant's out‑of‑court statements are offered in
evidence against him, the prosecution has a heavy burden to demonstrate that
the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self‑incrimination
and his right to retained or appointed counsel. Miranda, supra 384 U.S. at
475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. Commonwealth v. Cain, 361
Mass. 224, 228, 279 N.E.2d 706 (1972).
When the defendant is a juvenile, "courts proceed with 'special
caution.' " Id., quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 45, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1453, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). We have recently described at length the
special sensitivity with which we and other courts approach the question
whether a juvenile will be deemed to have waived his Miranda rights. We quote extensively from our opinion in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 389 Mass. 128,
131‑134, 449 N.E.2d 654 (1983):
"Recent studies have confirmed [the] need for caution in evaluating
a juvenile's waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. These studies suggest that most juveniles do
not understand the significance and protecting function of these rights even
when they are read the standard Miranda warnings.... Recognizing this inherent problem, a growing
number of State courts and Legislatures have followed the spirit of [In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967) ]
and mandated that before an admission can be obtained from a juvenile he must
be advised of his rights through a reading of the Miranda warnings and be given
the opportunity to consult with an adult who is informed of and understands
these rights.... [405 Mass. 501] By adopting these standards courts and Legislatures have
recognized the need for establishing an ascertainable basis for determining
that a knowing and intelligent waiver has preceded the interrogation of a
juvenile. These added protections are
consistent with our legal system's traditional policy which affords minors a
unique and protected status. The law
presumes different levels of responsibility for juveniles and adults and,
realizing that juveniles frequently lack the capacity to appreciate the
consequences of their actions, seeks to protect them from the possible
consequences of their immaturity.
Moreover, by providing the juvenile with the opportunity for meaningful
consultation with an informed adult, these procedures prevent the warnings from
becoming merely a ritualistic recitation wherein the effect of actual
comprehension by the juvenile is ignored. Commonwealth v. Smith, 472 Pa. 492, 497,
372 A.2d 797 (1977).
"...
"In
those jurisdictions which have adopted the 'interested adult' rule, the courts
have generally held that to demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver by a
juvenile the State must first prove that the juvenile and his parent, or if a
parent is not available, someone in loco parentis,
were fully advised of the juvenile's right against self‑incrimination
through administration of the standard Miranda warnings. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Smith, supra. We
conclude that, for the Commonwealth successfully to demonstrate a knowing and
intelligent waiver by a juvenile, in most cases it should show that a parent or
an interested adult was present, understood the warnings, and had the
opportunity to explain his rights to the juvenile so that the juvenile
understands the significance of waiver of these rights. For the purpose of obtaining the waiver, in
the case of juveniles who are under the age of fourteen, we conclude that no
waiver can be effective without this added protection. This procedure reflects our assumption that
an informed parent, or person standing in loco parentis,
will be better able to understand the child's rights, rights which a child of
such tender years is unlikely to comprehend fully without the assistance of
such person. For cases involving a
juvenile who has reached [405 Mass.
502] the age of fourteen, there
should ordinarily be a meaningful consultation with the parent, interested
adult, or attorney [or at least an opportunity for such consultation‑‑see Commonwealth v. MacNeill,
399 Mass. 71, 78, 502 N.E.2d 938 (1987) ] to ensure that the waiver is knowing
and intelligent. For a waiver to be
valid without such a consultation [or opportunity] the circumstances should
demonstrate a high degree of intelligence, experience, knowledge, or
sophistication on the part of the juvenile." (Citations omitted.) (Footnote omitted.)
[1] Our
traditional policy of affording minors "a unique and protected
status," id. 389 Mass. at 132,
449 N.E.2d 654, and the special caution in evaluating a juvenile's purported
waiver of Miranda rights which flows from that tradition surely demand that the
courts not accept as a qualified "advisor" one who, by reason of her
own legally presumed lack of maturity, is herself entitled to the law's special
protection. Leya‑Anne
Guyton, being less than eighteen years old when she consented to the police
interrogation of the sixteen year old defendant, was a minor. See G.L. c. 4, § 7
(1988 ed.). A minor cannot satisfy the
"interested adult" requirement articulated in Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, supra. (FN1)
[2] Since
the defendant did not have an opportunity to consult with an "interested
adult," we must consider whether nevertheless he effectively waived his Miranda
rights. In the case of a juvenile who is
at least fourteen, a waiver may "be valid without [an opportunity for]
consultation [if] the circumstances should demonstrate a high degree of
intelligence, experience, knowledge, or sophistication on the part of the
juvenile." Commonwealth[405 Mass. 503] v. A Juvenile, supra 389 Mass. at 134,
449 N.E.2d 654. The judge's finding
that, prior to March 3, 1985, the defendant had had "extensive contact
with the police and juvenile authorities and was well aware of his Miranda
rights," even if it were warranted by the evidence at the suppression
hearing, does not satisfy that test.
Extensive contact with the police and other authorities by itself does
not demonstrate unusual sophistication or knowledge about the Miranda
rights. Furthermore, in our view, the
evidence in this case did not warrant the judge's finding of such
"extensive contact."
According to the evidence, the defendant, who had stopped attending
school after the eighth grade and worked on a "cleaning crew"
cleaning factories, responded to a detective's question about whether he
understood his rights by saying, "[Y]es, I've
heard it before." However, there
is no evidence in the record to indicate that the defendant had
"heard" the Miranda warnings in connection with any police or
juvenile proceedings. The only other
evidence on that point was the defendant's testimony that he had heard Miranda
warnings "[o]n T.V. ... nobody ever read
anything like that to me before."
The Commonwealth argues that, by the time the defendant's statement was
taken at the police station, "he had heard the Miranda warnings at least
three times." Since all three of
those times were in connection with the March 3, 1985, incident, however, they
clearly shed no light on the defendant's sophistication at the critical time.
The
present case is unlike Commonwealth v.
King, 17 Mass.App.Ct. 602, 603, 610‑611,
460 N.E.2d 1299 (1984), in which a sixteen year old defendant was held capable
of waiving his Miranda rights despite the unavailability of an interested
adult. The defendant in that case had
been involved with the court system since the age of eleven and one‑half
years, and had, two weeks prior to the arrest in question, exercised his right
to consult with counsel and, after consultation, had remained silent. Instead, the evidence here, particularly that
the defendant retrieved the victim's money and delivered it to the police
officers in response to the detective's assurance to the defendant that it
would help him "a great deal" to do so, strongly supports the
inference that the defendant lacked experience and sophistication. [405
Mass. 504] We conclude that the denial of the
defendant's motion to suppress was harmful error requiring reversal and a new
trial.
[3] We
briefly address one evidentiary question which may arise again on retrial. The defendant argues that the judge erred in
allowing a witness to testify that, before March 3, 1985, the defendant in
three conversations had told him that a man named Angel Ventura knew someone
with a large sum of money, that Ventura was "staking it out," that
Ventura wanted the defendant to help him confiscate the money from this
person's apartment, and that the intended victim "didn't believe in banks." The defendant argues that this was not
relevant evidence, and that, even if it was relevant, the unfair prejudice of
admitting it outweighed its probative value.
The judge correctly admitted the testimony. The evidence was highly probative.
The
judgments are reversed, and the verdicts are set aside. The case is remanded to the Superior Court
for a new trial.
So ordered.
NOLAN,
Justice (dissenting).
The
court's result flies in the face of settled law, and, accordingly, I dissent.
We accept
a judge's subsidiary findings unless there is clear error. Commonwealth v. MacNeill, 399 Mass. 71, 76, 502 N.E.2d 938 (1987). We give substantial deference to the judge's
ultimate findings. Id.
The
judge's finding that Leya‑Anne could fulfil the role of an "interested adult" is not
clearly erroneous. She was thirteen days
away from her eighteenth birthday and was acting in loco parentis
for the defendant and two younger siblings.
She was a mother herself. The
defendant testified that he took to mind what his sister told him. Further, the judge had an opportunity to
witness her demeanor and her maturity at trial which, despite the time lapse,
permitted the judge to assess her character.
Although she did not go to the police station with the defendant, Leya‑Anne was present in the apartment when the
police first interrogated her brother about the money and was available over
the telephone before he was questioned at the police [405 Mass. 505]
station. The defendant chose not to
consult with his sister about the decision to waive his rights, but he had the
opportunity to do so and this is all that is necessary. Commonwealth v. MacNeill, supra at 78, 502 N.E.2d 938.
We have
often stated that we evaluate the totality of the circumstances when
considering the effectiveness of a Miranda waiver. Commonwealth v. Mandile, 397 Mass. 410, 413, 492 N.E.2d 74 (1986). Taking the circumstances as a whole, the
judge's denial of the motion to suppress is warranted in this case. This defendant was a "mature
juvenile" at the time of the arrest.
He was nearly seventeen years old;
he was working; he had prior
experience with the criminal justice system.
There was no evidence that he was intoxicated or mentally ill. There was no improper police inducement to
confess. While the police might have
tried harder to reach the defendant's father in Boston, the finding that Leya‑Anne served as an interested adult is not
clearly in error.
(FN1.) When Leya‑Anne
Guyton consented to interrogation of the defendant, she was thirteen days less
than eighteen years old. We need not
decide whether, had she been eighteen, the judge would have been warranted in
concluding that Leya‑Anne, who had been
educated through the tenth grade, qualified as an interested adult. In keeping with the spirit of Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, supra,
however, we have serious reservations about whether the evidence presented at
the suppression hearing, including Leya‑Anne's
testimony that she "understood" the Miranda warnings, was enough to
demonstrate that Leya‑Anne's understanding was
adequate to qualify her to advise the defendant about so crucial a question as
whether he should relinquish his constitutional rights to remain silent and
have counsel.