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Opinions of The and the Court of Appeals To be used in
conjunction with the CPS Criminal Procedure Textbook |
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CPS Commonwealth
Police Service, Inc. and the Law Office of Patrick Michael Rogers |
Commonwealth v. Edwards, 420
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Argued
Decided
John M. Galvin,
[420
Roger Witkin,
Before [420
[420
The
defendants were indicted, along with codefendant Cory Selby, on one count of
murder in the first degree, unlawful possession of a firearm, and entering a
dwelling while armed with the intent to commit a felony. Edwards, Gunter, and Selby individually filed
motions to suppress custodial statements made to the police. The motions were denied and each codefendant
was granted leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal by a single justice of this
court. The three motions contained
substantially the same assertions, and therefore their appeals were
consolidated. This opinion addresses the
arguments presented by Edwards and Gunter. (FN2) The claims of error raised by codefendant
Cory Selby, and their resolution, are discussed separately. Commonwealth v. Selby, ante
656, 651 N.E.2d 843 (1995).
The motion
judge found the following facts with regard to the custodial interrogation of
Edwards. These findings are "
'binding in the absence of clear error ... and [we] view with particular
respect the conclusions of law which are based on them.' Commonwealth v. Correia, 381
In May,
1992, Boston police Detectives Timothy Murray and Dennis Harris began investigating
the murder of one Jack Berry, Jr. In
June, 1992, Larricia McConnico
informed Murray that she had witnessed the murder of Berry and that it had
occurred when Cory Selby and Mark Edwards confronted the victim on March 22,
1991. McConnico
stated that Selby shot the victim during the confrontation.
Edwards
was placed under arrest and booked for murder, armed assault in a dwelling, and
unlawfully carrying a firearm. The judge
found that Edwards was "alert, coherent, [and] understood what was transpiring." He also found that Edwards had graduated
high school and had attended college for two years. Edwards was read, and himself read, Miranda
(FN3) rights from a printed form. He initialled each of the Miranda rights on the form and
printed his name in the space indicating that he had read and understood his
rights and was nevertheless willing to make a statement without an attorney
present. He then signed the form and
telephoned his mother.
Detective
Dennis Harris told Edwards that he had been identified in connection with a
murder. Edwards asked that, if they were
talking about a murder, where were Paul and "Floyd" (an alias of
Selby). (FN4) He then began to make a
statement in which he described the circumstances of the murder. Edwards said that he had been walking in the
Dorchester section of Boston and had been picked up by Paul Gunter, Floyd, and
a woman. He said that he asked them for
a ride to his mother's house. While in
the car, Edwards heard Floyd and Gunter discussing a robbery that had occurred
in which drugs and money were taken.
When the name of one of the robbers was mentioned, Edwards said that he
knew the man [420 Mass. 669] and if he went with them to see the
man he might prevent anyone from getting hurt.
Edwards
claimed that he went to the victim's residence with the others but did not
enter the building. Harris told him that
he matched a description of one of the assailants. Edwards maintained that he did not enter the
victim's apartment. However, the
detectives had information, including statements from McConnico,
that Selby and Edwards had entered the apartment of the victim.
Murray
then asked Edwards how his handprint could have been found in the building if
his statement that he had not entered the building was true. In fact, the police had not found the print
in the building, it was being used as a "ruse" to induce Edwards to
admit he had been in the building.
Edwards then admitted to being in the building, that he had been
carrying a knife which looked like a gun, and that "Floyd" got into a
struggle with a man in the apartment during which the man was shot three times.
Edwards
then repeated this statement on tape. At
the conclusion of the statement, Edwards acknowledged that he had received and
understood his Miranda rights and that he had been given some food during the
interrogation. Edwards then picked a
photograph of Paul Gunter from an array.
About
three hours later, the interrogation on tape resumed briefly. Edwards stated that he had identified
"Floyd," also known as Cory Selby, in a photographic array and that
he was the person who shot the victim.
The judge
found that "[a]t all times during the interview, Edwards was coherent,
alert and responsive. He never said that
he wanted to remain silent or that he wanted to stop answering questions and he
never stated that he wanted to have a lawyer."
Based on
these findings, the judge concluded that Edwards made a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights and that his statements were made
voluntarily.
[1] [2]
[3] 1. Miranda waiver. The Commonwealth bears the burden of proving
the validity of a Miranda waiver beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Day, 387
Mass. 915, 920‑921, 444 N.E.2d 384[420
Mass. 670] (1983).
To be valid the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Although this issue, being one of
constitutional dimensions, is open for review by this court, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 377 Mass. 319,
325, 386 N.E.2d 15 (1979), quoting
Commonwealth v. Haas, 373 Mass. 545, 550, 369 N.E.2d 692 (1977), the
judge's finding that Edwards made a valid waiver is entitled to substantial
deference. Commonwealth v. Day, supra at 920, 444 N.E.2d
384.
Edwards
does not dispute the initial validity of the Miranda waiver obtained by the
detectives when he was originally read his rights on his arrival at the
homicide division and prior to the start of any interrogation. Rather, he argues that the waiver became
involuntary, and thus invalid, once the detectives used the false handprint to
elicit incriminating statements from him.
He also argues that the use of the false handprint rendered any
subsequent waiver of his Miranda rights likewise involuntary. Therefore, Edwards concludes, any statements
made subsequent to the introduction of the false handprint, including the
videotaped statement, must be suppressed as they were obtained in violation of
Edwards's Miranda rights.
[4] In
determining whether a waiver was made voluntarily, the court must examine the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the waiver.
Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 395 Mass. 336, 345, 479 N.E.2d 1371
(1985). See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1046, 103 S.Ct.
2830, 2835, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), quoting
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct.
1880, 1885 n. 9, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).
This test is essentially the same as that used for determining the voluntariness of statements under the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution (see our discussion
in part 2 below), although they are separate and distinct issues. See
Commonwealth v. Medeiros, supra at 343, 479 N.E.2d 1371;
Commonwealth v. Williams, 388 Mass. 846, 851 & n. 2, 448 N.E.2d
1114 (1983); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379 Mass. 422,
428, 399 N.E.2d 460 (1980). In light of
the totality of the circumstances present in the instant case, we conclude that
Edwards voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.
[420 Mass. 671] [5] [6] First, Edwards's assertion that the detectives were
required to readvise him of his Miranda rights and
obtain a second waiver prior to videotaping his statements is without legal
support. As a general rule, if police
have already obtained a valid waiver from a suspect, they are not required to readvise a suspect of his Miranda rights or obtain a second
waiver absent a break in the interrogation such as an exercise of the
defendant's rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
or a request for counsel or, in certain instances, when there is a significant
lapse of time between the waiver and the statements. See
Commonwealth v. Mello, ante 375, 386 (1995).
[7] We do
not agree with Edwards that the instant case is governed by our holding in Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra, nor is
the instant case similar to Commonwealth
v. Taylor, 374 Mass. 426, 374 N.E.2d 81 (1978). In those cases, we suppressed the defendants'
statements because the police used trickery or deceitful tactics in an effort
to obtain a waiver after the defendants had exercised their right to remain
silent or requested counsel. The use of
trickery in obtaining a waiver is disapproved of and may indicate that any subsequent
waiver was made involuntarily. Miranda v. Arizona, supra at 476, 86 S.Ct. at 1628. Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra at 328
& n. 8, 386 N.E.2d 15. However,
"[a]lthough officially dispensed misinformation
is always relevant to, and a warning signal for, the issue whether there has been
a voluntary waiver of the right to remain silent, the resolution of the issue
turns, in the end, on an analysis of the entire circumstances in which a
damaging admission has been made." Commonwealth v. Nero, 14 Mass.App.Ct. 714, 717, 442 N.E.2d 430 (1982). Thus, trickery alone may not invalidate a
waiver if there is evidence, in light of the other surrounding circumstances,
that the waiver was made voluntarily.
[8] Unlike
the defendants in Jackson and Taylor, Edwards made an indisputably
valid waiver of his Miranda rights upon his arrival at the homicide division
and did not exercise his right to remain silent, request counsel, or otherwise
break off the interrogation at any point.
See Commonwealth v. Medieros, supra at 344; Commonwealth v. Nero, supra
at [420 Mass. 672] 718, 442 N.E.2d 430 ("It is
significant that the defendant never invoked his right to remain silent nor his
right to have counsel before he began to make his inculpatory
statements"). These circumstances
are more similar to those addressed by this court in Commonwealth v. Forde, 392 Mass. 453,
466 N.E.2d 510 (1984). In Forde, after
being read his Miranda rights, the defendant was falsely told that fingerprints
could be taken from a corpse and that his fingerprints had been found on the
victim's body. Id. at 454‑455 & n. 1, 466
N.E.2d 510. Thereafter, the defendant
made incriminating statements. We agreed
with the judge below that the defendant had made a voluntary waiver of his Miranda
rights. We stated that "the
defendant had not asserted his right to remain silent, and thus he is not
necessarily entitled to suppression....
Nor do the characteristics of the accused or the circumstances of the
interrogation suggest that the defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was
anything but voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The use of misinformation by the police does
not in itself defeat a showing of voluntary waiver of rights.... Having considered the totality of the
circumstances, we conclude that the waiver was valid." (Citations omitted.) Id. at 455‑456, 466
N.E.2d 510. In the instant case, the
evidence weighs more heavily in favor of a conclusion that Edwards's waiver was
voluntary than the facts of the Forde case.
Edwards had already made a waiver of his rights some time prior to the
introduction of the false handprint.
Edwards suggests that an otherwise valid waiver may somehow become
involuntary in the midst of an interrogation by the introduction of falsely
incriminating information by the police.
Whether this may be true in some instances, on Miranda grounds, we need
not decide. It is clear to us in the
instant case that, in the totality of the circumstances, the indisputably valid
waiver made at the time of Edwards's arrival at the homicide division remained
voluntary throughout the interrogation, and was not rendered involuntary by the
use of the false handprint.
Although
the use of the false handprint likely factored into Edwards's decision to
confess, we do not think that his will was overcome so as to render the waiver
involuntary, especially[420 Mass.
673]
in light of the remaining circumstances, all of which indicate that
Edwards made a valid waiver. See United States v. Velasquez, 885 F.2d
1076, 1089 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1017, 110 S.Ct.
1321, 108 L.Ed.2d 497 (1990). Not only
did Edwards indicate that he was willing to speak to the detectives after being
advised of his Miranda rights, the judge found that he was lucid and alert
throughout the interrogation and possessed no characteristics or disabilities
which weigh against our conclusion that the waiver was voluntary. Under his circumstances, we conclude that
Edwards made a valid waiver of his Miranda rights which supports the
admissibility of the statements at issue.
2. Voluntariness of
confession. Edwards also claims, as
did codefendant Selby, that the intentional use of false evidence by Murray and
Harris rendered his subsequent statements involuntary in violation of his due
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
We disagree.
[9] In
determining whether Edwards voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, we examined
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of the waiver.
In examining the voluntariness of the
statements, on common law due process grounds, we instead examine the totality
of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements themselves in an
effort to determine whether they were the product of a "rational
intellect" and a "free will." Commonwealth v. Selby, ante at 662, 651
N.E.2d 843 (1995). The voluntariness of the waiver on the basis of Miranda and the
voluntariness of the statements on due process
grounds are separate and distinct issues but they are both determined in light
of the totality of the circumstances and they share many of the same relevant
factors. See id. See also Commonwealth v. Forde,
392 Mass. 453, 455‑456, 466 N.E.2d 510 (1984); Commonwealth v. Garcia, 379
Mass. 422, 428, 399 N.E.2d 460 (1980); Commonwealth v. Cruz, 373 Mass. 676, 688‑689,
369 N.E.2d 996 (1977).
[10] [11]
As we stated in Commonwealth v. Selby,
supra, the use of false information by police to elicit statements is a
relevant factor in determining whether statements were made involuntarily in
violation of due process. However, in
light of the [420 Mass. 674] totality of the circumstances, we
believe that Edwards's statements were nevertheless made voluntarily. Edwards does not argue that other
circumstances existed during the interrogation, or that he possesses relevant
characteristics, which would render his statements involuntary. He relies solely on the use of the false
handprint by the detectives.
In
determining the voluntariness of the admissions, the
judge properly considered the fact that Edwards was read complete and accurate
Miranda warnings and made a valid waiver of those rights prior to making the
statements at issue. See Frazier v. Cupp,
394 U.S. 731, 739, 89 S.Ct. 1420, 1424, 22 L.Ed.2d
684 (1969) ("Before petitioner made any incriminating statements, he
received partial warnings of his constitutional rights; this is, of course, a circumstance quite
relevant to a finding of voluntariness"). See also
Commonwealth v. Selby, supra at 664, 651 N.E.2d 843. Moreover, the motion judge found that
Edwards was "coherent, alert and responsive" during the
interrogation. Based on the facts
presented, we do not think that the use of the false handprint rendered the
subsequent statements involuntary in violation of due process. See
Frazier v. Cupp, supra at 739, 89 S.Ct. at 1424; United States ex rel.
Lathan v. Deegan, 450
F.2d 181, 185 (2d Cir.1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1071, 92 S.Ct. 1520, 31 L.Ed.2d 803 (1972) ("A mere deception
by an interrogator, ipso facto, does not invalidate a confession absent other
compelling circumstances").
The orders
denying the motions to suppress are affirmed.
So ordered.
NOLAN, J.,
participated in the deliberation on this case, but retired before the opinion
was issued.
FN1.
Commonwealth vs. Paul Gunter.
FN2. The single brief filed on behalf of
defendants Edwards and Gunter addresses almost entirely the assertions of
Edwards. With regard to defendant
Gunter, the brief includes only a short, conclusory
argument that Gunter's statements were made involuntarily. We conclude that Gunter's assertions as
briefed do not rise to the level of adequate appellate argument. Massachusetts Rules of Appellate Procedure
16(a)(4), as amended, 367 Mass. 921 (1975).
See Commonwealth v. Cook, 419
Mass. 192, 194 n. 1, 644 N.E.2d 203 (1994).
Nevertheless, we have reviewed the transcript of the motion hearing (no
written findings were filed as to Gunter) and conclude that there is no merit
to Gunter's claim that his statements were made involuntarily. The motion was properly denied.
FN3.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602,
16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
FN4. The interrogating officers had not, at that
point, referred to any other individuals.