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Opinions of The and the Court of Appeals To be used in
conjunction with the CPS Criminal Procedure Textbook |
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CPS Commonwealth
Police Service, Inc. and the Law Office of Patrick Michael Rogers |
Commonwealth v. Duffy, 36 Mass.App.Ct.
937 (1994)
No. 93‑P‑232.
Appeals Court of Massachusetts.
Further Appellate Review Denied
Stephen Hrones,
Austin J. Freeley, Asst.
Dist. Atty., for the Com.
RESCRIPT.
After
fatally stabbing his girl friend seventeen times, the defendant walked into the
On appeal,
the defendant claims that the judge erred in limiting his definition of
criminal responsibility to the charges of first degree and second degree murder
in his response to a jury question and, thus, depriving him of a conviction of
the lesser crime of manslaughter or an acquittal; in [36
Mass.App.Ct. 938]
denying his motion to suppress his statements to the police; and in allowing a police officer to sit at
the prosecutor's table during the trial.
We affirm the conviction.
1. Jury question. During his charge to the jury, the judge had
instructed the jury that the Commonwealth had to prove the defendant was
criminally responsible at the time of his act but had not defined the term,
"criminal responsibility."
During the jury's deliberations, the jury asked the judge for a
definition of criminal responsibility.
The judge responded by giving an accurate definition of criminal
responsibility under Commonwealth v. McHoul, 352 Mass. 544, 546‑547, 226 N.E.2d 556
(1967). Before doing so, however, he
asked the foreman whether the question referred to his "instructions on
diminished criminal responsibility reducing first‑degree murder to a
consideration of second‑degree murder." The foreman responded in the
affirmative. By prefacing his response
with this question, the defendant contends that the judge committed prejudicial
error because he restricted the jury's consideration of criminal responsibility
to the difference between first and second degree murder and deprived the jury
of consideration of a manslaughter verdict or an acquittal based on the McHoul
standard. While we consider the judge's
question to the jury improper and his response somewhat misleading, we deem any
error harmless.
[1] [2]
The adequacy of individual instructions to the jury must be considered in the
context of the entire charge. Commonwealth v. Gilchrist, 413
[3] 2. Motion to suppress. The defendant filed a motion to suppress all
statements made by the defendant to the police after the crime. He contended that his statements were not
voluntary and that he had not made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his
Miranda rights because of his level of intoxication and his low level of
intelligence. There is, however, no per
se rule holding statements given by individuals who suffer from mental
impairment resulting from alcohol or mental disease to be inadmissible.
Commonwealth[36 Mass.App.Ct. 939] v. Vazquez, 387 Mass. 96, 100, 438 N.E.2d
856 (1982). Commonwealth v. Libran, 405 Mass. 634,
639, 543 N.E.2d 5 (1989). A statement is
inadmissible only if it would not have been obtained but for the effects of the
confessor's mental impairment. Commonwealth v. Libran, supra. Here, the motion judge (who was also the
trial judge) concluded that any mental impairment that the defendant suffered
did not impede his ability to waive his Miranda rights or make a voluntary
statement.
[4] There
was ample evidence to support this conclusion.
While it is undisputed that the defendant had been drinking in the hours
immediately before walking into the police station and spontaneously informing
the desk officer that he had killed someone, there was evidence that he was
able to walk without any trouble, was coherent, communicated accurate
information to the police, and provided the police with directions to the scene
of the crime. There was also evidence
that he was conscious of the consequence of his actions when he stated to the detective who questioned him that he was
wrong and deserved to be punished.
Although there was evidence that the defendant possessed a below normal
level of intelligence, there was no testimony that he was incapable of
understanding his Miranda rights, which according to the evidence were read to
him on at least three occasions‑‑in fact at one point he stated he
was aware of his rights without them being read to him. See
Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366 Mass. 601, 606, 321 N.E.2d 822 (1975)
("an adult with a diminished or subnormal mental capacity may make an
effective waiver of his rights and render a voluntary, knowing and admissible
confession"); Commonwealth v. Wallen,
35 Mass.App.Ct. 915, 917, 619 N.E.2d 365 (1993). There was also evidence presented that he had
worked steadily during his adult life, including employment as an MBTA bus
driver, and was employed by a dry cleaner at the time of the commission of this
crime. There was absolutely no evidence
that the police coerced the defendant into making the incriminating statements
or that his will was overborne by the police.
See Commonwealth v. Medeiros,
395 Mass. 336, 346, 479 N.E.2d 1371 (1985).
In fact, there was evidence that two of the three statements that the
judge ruled admissible were unsolicited by the police. Based upon our review of the record, we
conclude that the judge properly denied the motion to suppress.
[5] 3. Witness seated at prosecutor's table. The defendant asserts that it was reversible
error for the judge to allow a police officer, who was the chief investigator
in the case, to sit at the prosecutor's table during the trial. The prosecutor represented that the officer's
presence was necessary because he had managed the case "from A to Z,"
and the prosecutor would be conferring with him constantly. In these circumstances, we do not deem the
judge's allowance of the officer to be seated at counsel table an abuse of
discretion. Commonwealth v. Auguste,
414 Mass. 51, 59‑60, 605 N.E.2d 819 (1992).
Judgment affirmed.