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Opinions of The and the Court of Appeals To be used in
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CPS Commonwealth
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Commonwealth v. Daniels, 366
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Hampden.
Argued
Decided
[366
John T. McDonough, Asst. Dist. Atty. (William W. Teahan,
Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., with him), for the Commonwealth.
Before [366
[366
The
defendant (Daniels), a mentally retarded young man with a second‑grade
reading ability and an I.Q. of fifty‑three, was found guilty of murder in
the second degree solely on the basis of his confession to the Sprinfield police.
In this appeal, which is subject to G.L. c. 278, ss
33A‑‑33G, Daniels argues that, for various reasons, evidence of his
alleged confession and admissions should have been suppressed, and that, if
they had been suppressed, he would have been entitled to a directed
verdict. Although they were not the
subject of any exception (or even objection) at trial, Daniels also challenges
certain aspects of the judge's charge to the jury, asking this court to
consider these challenges within its power under G.L. c. 278, s 33E.
[366
Daniels,
who was then twenty‑six years old, lived alone in an apartment at
Late in
the morning of the day the victim's body was found, a Springfield police
officer spoke to Daniels in the vicinity of 976 and 986 State Street. He told Daniels that there had been an
incident and asked him if he would go to the police station to talk with the
investigating officers. Daniels agreed
and went of his own volition.
The
account of what transpired at the police station, summarized next in this
opinion, is based on the findings made by the judge following the voir dire and on the evidence which was introduced at
trial. As to events at the police
station, there was no significant difference between the evidence introduced at
the voir dire and the evidence introduced at the
trial. (FN2)
Daniels
was turned over to the officer in charge of the investigation at approximately
noontime. He was taken to an
interrogation room, approximately ten feet square. Four officers questioned him from time to
time, but not all were present at all times.
Initially he was given 'his Miranda warnings.' (FN3)
See Miranda v. Arizona, 38j U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct.
1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Daniels
said he knew he had rights, because he had heard about them and seem them on
television. He also was told that See
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. The officers testified that Daniels said he
understood the explanations of his rights which were given to him.
[1]
Although, initially, he denied that he had ever been in the victim's apartment,
by 3 P.M. he had made an oral confession to stabbing the victim with a
knife. About 3 P.M. an officer who
previously had not been present came in.
He [366 Mass. 605] also gave Daniels Miranda warnings,
and, being uncertain whether Daniels understood, he explained them again in
detail. A written statement was then
prepared, which Daniels tried to read but could not. It was read to him, and he signed it. Daniels then went with five policemen to the
victim's apartment, where, according to testimony from policemen, he described
how he
committed the crime. (FN4)
Daniels was booked at the police station shortly before 7 P.M., on his
return from the apartment, and was arraigned the next morning.
Almost a
year after the denial of Daniels's motion to suppress, the judge filed a
memorandum and order which contained strong findings that Daniels 'did
knowingly, willingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his constitutional
rights under the Miranda warnings,' in an act 'which was a product of a
rational intellect.' The judge further
found that 'the prosecution has carried its heavy burden that the defendant
knowingly, willingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his privilege against
self‑incrimination and his right to retained or appointed counsel during
the period he was in custody.' He found
that no force was used and no promises were made by the police to obtain the
oral and written statements. He further
found that there was no 'physical or psychological pressure by the police at
any time,' and that Daniels's statements to the police were a meaningful act of
violation. He made no reference in his
findings to Daniels's I.Q. We turn first
to a consideration of the legal principles governing the admission in evidence
of confessions made in the course of police interrogation of persons like
Daniels.
[2] [3]
[4] [5] A minor may waive constitutional rights and make a confession which is
admissible against him. See West v.
United States, 399 F.2d 467, 468‑‑469 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. den.,
393 U.S. 1102, 89 S.Ct. 903, 21 L.Ed.2d 795 (1969);
Cotton v. United States, 446 [366
Mass. 606] F.2d 107, 110 (8th Cir.
1971). See, for decisions not governed
by the Miranda case, Commonwealth v. Bond,
170 Mass. 41, 48 N.E. 756 (1897); Commonwealth v. Makarewicz,
333 Mass. 575, 132 N.E.2d 294 (1956); People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 378‑‑386,
62 Cal.Rptr. 586, 432 P.2d 202 (1967), cert. den.,
392 U.S. 945, 88 S.Ct. 2303, 20 L.Ed.2d 1407 (1968);
People v. Hester, 39 Ill.2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466 (1968), cert. dism. as improvidently granted, 397 U.S. 660, 90 S.Ct. 1408, 25 L.Ed.2d 642 (1970); United States ex rel. Richardson v. Vitek, 395
F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1968). Similarly, an
adult with a diminished or subnormal mental capacity may make an effective
waiver of his rights and render a voluntary, knowing and admissible
confession. See Commonwealth v. Clark,
292 Mass. 409, 411‑‑412, 198 N.E. 641 (1935); Commonwealth v. Valcourt, 333 Mass. 706, 709‑‑710, 133 N.E.2d
217 (1956); Commonwealth v. Harrison, 342 Mass. 279, 284‑‑285, 173
N.E.2d 87 (1961); Commonwealth v. Femino, 352 Mass.
508, 515‑‑516, 226 N.E.2d 248 (1967); United States v. White, 451
F.2d 696, 700 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. den., 405 U.S. 998, 92 S.Ct.
1268, 31 L.Ed.2d 468 (1972) (post‑Miranda). But see United States v. Hull, 441 F.2d 308
(7th Cir. 1971) (thirty‑four year old mental defective). However, circumstances and techniques of
custodial interrogation which pass constitutional muster when applied to a
normal adult may not be constitutionally tolerable as applied to one who is
immature or mentally deficient. See
Commonwealth v. Cain, ‑‑‑ Mass. ‑‑‑, ‑‑‑
(fifteen‑year old boy), (FNa) 279 N.E.2d 706
(1972); Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54‑‑55, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962) (fourteen‑year old
boy); United States v. Blocker, 354 F.Supp. 1195,
1200‑‑1202 (D.D.C.1973) (limited mental ability). In such cases, 'special care in scrutinizing
the record must be used.' Haley v. Ohio,
332 U.S. 596, 599, 68 S.Ct. 302, 304, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948).
Whether the facts support the admission of a confession in any given case must be determined by an examination of
'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances‑‑both the
characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation.' Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct.
2041, 2047, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
[6] We
have carefully reviewed the evidence, both before the judge at the voir dire and before the jury, and we conclude that there
was evidence which warranted the findings made by the judge and which would
have warranted a conclusion by the jury that the confession could be considered
by [366 Mass. 607] them.
A finding that the police used physical force, intimidation or threats
would not have been justified. Certainly
a finding that the questioning was improper, leading or suggestive of desired
answers would not have been appropriate on the evidence. Daniels was not denied access to food or
drink. He declined to speak on the
telephone to a friend who had helped him occasionally and who called during the
police questioning. The interrogation
lasted not over three hours before Daniels confessed. Cf. Fikes v.
Alabama, 352 U.S. 191, 196‑‑197, 77 S.Ct.
281, 1 L.Ed.2d 246 (1957), reh. den., 352 U.S. 1019,
77 S.Ct. 553, 1 L.Ed.2d 561 (1957); Sims v. Georgia,
389 U.S. 404, 407, 88 S.Ct. 523, 19 L.Ed.2d 634
(1967). (FN5)
[7] The
fact that Daniels was mildly to moderately mentally retarded, with an I.Q. of
fifty‑three, does not compel a determination as matter of law on this
record that Daniels did not knowingly and willingly waive his Miranda rights
and make a voluntary confession, admissible pursuant to constitutional
standards. Daniels, although mentally
retarded, had had twenty‑six years of living experience and had been
discharged into the community from a State school for the mentally retarded by
way of a 'half‑way house.' He
testified before the judge on the voir dire and
before the jury at trial. In these
circumstances and on this record, we cannot rule that an error of law was
committed when Daniels's confession was not suppressed and was subsequently
introduced at his trial. See
Commonwealth v. Mabey, 299 Mass. 96, 98‑‑99,
12 N.E.2d 61 (1937); Commonwealth v. Murphy, ‑‑‑ Mass. ‑‑‑,
‑‑‑, (FNb)289 N.E.2d 571 (1972).
[8]
Although we have reached this conclusion, we believe, nevertheless, in the
exercise of our power under G.L. c. 278, s 33E, that justice requires a new
trial. See Commonwealth v. Rutledge, 356
Mass. 499, 502‑‑503, 254 N.E.2d 239 (1969). See also Commonwealth v. Mazza,
‑‑‑ Mass. ‑‑‑, ‑‑‑, (FNc) 313 N.E.2d 375 (1974), for a [366 Mass. 608] listing
of numerous cases in which this court has used its power under s 33E. We have arrived at our view that there should
be a new trial because no evidence was presented at the voir
dire or at the trial to aid the trier of fact in
evaluating the impact of custodial interrogation on Daniels in these
circumstances. He might be more
suggestible and subject to intimidation than a person of normal intelligence. He might not be able to understand the
consequences of his right to a lawyer or his right to remain silent. He might be inclined to state that he
understands even when he does not. Many
of Daniels's statements that he understood his rights were simple 'yes's' or 'yeah's,' and not reassuring explanations of his asserted
comprehension. See Commonwealth v. Cain, ‑‑‑ Mass. ‑‑‑,
‑‑‑, (FNd) 279 N.E.2d 706
(1972). Furthermore, the police officers
testified that Daniels had difficulty understanding their explanations of his
rights. On this record, in which the
only evidence that Daniels committed the crime came from his confession and his
admissions, a substantial injustice may have been done to him because of the
absence of expert testimony on the crucial issues of voluntariness
and waiver. We do not know enough about
intelligence quotients (I.Q.) and mental retardation to rule conclusively on
this question. Yet we do know enough to
believe the matter needs further analysis.
(FN6)
[366 Mass. 609] [9] There is another reason for granting a new trial. The evidence before the jury showed that
Daniels had a second‑grade reading ability and that at some time he had
been at the Belchertown State School.
However, for some unexplained reason, significant available evidence
bearing on Daniels's mental capacity was not introduced before the jury,
although it had been introduced at the voir
dire. The jury were not told that
Daniels had been at the Belchertown State School for at least half his life, that
he had an I.Q. of fifty‑three and that he was regarded medically as
mildly to moderately retarded. Cf.
Commonwealth v. Femino, 352 Mass. 508, 515‑‑516,
226 N.E.2d 248 (1967). If even this
evidence (although not interpreted by an expert witness) had been before the
jury, the verdict might have been different.
The jury deliberations were protracted and at one point characterized as
deadlocked. The only serious question
must have been Daniels's capacity to waive his constitutional rights and to
give a voluntary confession. (FN7)
In sum, we
believe that there should have been a greater exposition of Daniels's capacity
to arrive at knowing and voluntary judgments on matters of great importance to
him, particularly in the context of the police questioning which he
underwent. Such an inquiry can occur at
a further hearing on the motion to suppress and, if appropriate following that voir dire, at a new trial.
We would expect tha medical and perhaps other
expert testimony would be offered at any further hearings. If he remains indigent, Daniels should, of
course, be provided with sufficient funds to obtain expert assistance in any
such inquiry. In view of our decision,
we need consider only those other issues argued by Daniels which may arise
during the further proceedings in the Superior Court.
[366 Mass. 610] [10] Daniels argues that he was placed under arrest before there
was probable cause to arrest him (Commonwealth v. Avery, ‑‑‑
Mass. ‑‑‑, ‑‑‑, (FNe)
309 N.E.2d 497 (1974), and that, therefore, any confession, even one given
after a voluntary and knowing waiver of rights, must be suppressed as the
product of an illegal arrest. We need
not decide this question because the evidence does not support a finding of an
illegal arrest. Daniels went to the
police station voluntarily, and was not restrained until after he had disclosed
sufficient facts to justify his arrest.
[11] The
confession was not rendered inadmissible by the police failure to comply with
the requirements of G.L. c. 276, s 33A.
That statute provides that a person held in custody at a police station
(or at some other place of detention having a telephone) must be permitted to
use the telephone 'to communicate with his family or friends, or to arrange for
release on bail, or to engage the services of an attorney.' There was evidence that Daniels was given
timely notice that he could call 'anybody.'
Although it would have been preferable if the police had recited the
purposes for which such a call could be made, there was sufficient compliance
with the purpose of the statute so that evidence of Daniels's confession need
not be suppressed. Cf. COMMONWEALTH V.
JONES, ‑‑‑ MASS. ‑‑‑, 287 N.E.2D 599 (1972)(FNF).
[12] The
delay in arraigning Daniels until the morning following his confession was not
unreasonable and does not require the suppression of his confession. See Commonwealth v. Dubois, 353 Mass. 223,
226‑‑227, 230 N.E.2d 906 (1967).
[13] The
judge's failure to file findings with respect to the denial of the motion to
suppress, until almost twelve months after his ruling on that motion, does not
render the findings unreliable. Where
necessary, we have remanded criminal cases for findings in support or
explanation of interlocutory rulings.
There is no indication that the judge applied incorrect legal standards
in denying the motion to suppress or that he based his conclusion that the
confession was voluntary in any respect on a belief that the confession was
true. Nor do we see any suggestion that
the judge reached his conclusions concerning Daniels's waiver of his [366 Mass. 611] constitutional rights because Daniels was found competent to
stand trial. The standards for these
determinations are different, of course, and were not confused by the judge.
For the
reasons stated earlier in this opinion, however, the judgment is reversed and
the verdict is set aside for further proceedings in the Superior Court.
So
ordered.
FN1. The Bridgewater State Hospital examination,
which was conducted presumably pursuant to G.L. c. 123, s 15, as amended
through St.1971, c. 760, s 12, dealt with Daniels's competency to stand trial
and with his criminal responsibility at the time of the commission of the
alleged offense. The observation report
expressed the opinion that, despite his mental deficiency, Daniels was
competent to stand trial and was 'mentally and criminally responsible' on
August 21, 1972.
Although
that report did not address the question whether Daniels had the mental
capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights and to make a
voluntary and intelligent confession to a crime, some opinions were given
concerning Daniel's level of judgment.
No other medical opinions were offered at the voir
dire, and, as indicated in the text of the opinion, the conclusions stated in
the Bridgewater report were not before the jury.
Seven
days after Daniels was admitted to Bridgewater, he was described as
'functioning on a low average level of intelligence,' '(j)udgment
and insight were very poor' and '(m)emory was
impaired.' A week later Daniels was
described (in part) as 'showing limited insight and judgment into his problems,
but with coaching he appeared to understand what the charges against him
are.' An extension of the statutory twenty‑day
observation period was requested for further testing and was granted. During the extended observation period,
opinions of competency to stand trial and 'mentally and criminally responsible
at the time of the commission of the offense' were arrived at, as well as the
diagnosis: 'Mental Deficiency, I.Q. 53, Mild to Moderate.'
FN2. Daniels gave a different description of what
occurred, which was not accepted by the judge at the voir
dire nor, apparently, by the jury. He
testified that he signed a statement, but he did not know or understand what he
was signing. He said he signed because
the police told him that if he talked, they would let him go, but if he did not
talk, they would lock him up. At trial
he denied stabbing the victim.
FN3. He was told, in the usual form, that he had a
right to remain silent; that if he did speak, anything he might say would be
used against him; that he had a right to talk to a lawyer and have him present
while he was being questioned; and that if he could not afford to hire a
lawyer, one would be hired for him.
FN4. The fact that there was evidence from the
police that during this trip Daniels corroborated portions of his confession
has no bearing on the admissibility of that confession. True, as well as false, confessions are
inadmissible if obtained in violation of a defendant's rights. Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 543‑‑544,
81 S.Ct. 735, 5 L.Ed.2d 760 (1961). Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 384‑‑386, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12
L.Ed.2d 908 (1964).
FNa. Mass.Adv.Sh. (1972)
373, 376‑‑377.
FN5. Although it appears that the police were
aware of Daniels's mental retardation, the admissibility of his confession does
not depend on whether the police had such knowledge. His capacity to make a knowing and
intelligent waiver of his rights is unrelated to the existence or absence of
police knowledge of his mental capacity.
See Commonwealth v. Femino, 352 Mass. 508,
514, 226 N.E.2d 248 (1967). Such police
knowledge is relevant in assessing the conduct of the police on due process of
law grounds. We reject, however, the
defendant's argument that the confession, if voluntarily given after a knowing
and willing waiver of Miranda rights, was obtained in violation of due process
requirements.
FNb. Mass.Adv.Sh. (1972)
1679, 1683.
FNc. Mass.Adv.Sh. (1974)
1199, 1201‑‑1202.
FNd. Mass.Adv.Sh. (1972)
373, 377.
FN6. Where sufficient medical or other testimony
concerning the mental capacity of a defendant (whose confession has been
offered) has not been introduced below and medical or other expert testimony
seemingly would be of assistance to the lower court in passing on a motion to
suppress. Federal appellate courts have
sent cases back for further hearings.
See United States v. Silva, 418 F.2d 328, 331 (2d Cir. 1969); Frazier v.
United States, 136 U.S.App.D.C. 180, 419 F.2d 1161,
1169 (1969), which remanded a case for a further hearing, and United States v.
Frazier, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 135, 476 F.2d 891 (1973),
upholding the admissibility of a confession following that further hearing at
which expert medical testimony was introduced; United States v. Watson, 469
F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1972).
Where
medical or other evidence relating to the mental capacity of an allegedly
mentally deficient defendant has been introduced, Federal decisions indicate
that any ruling on the voluntariness of the
defendant's action should be made with particular attention to that medical
evidence. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361
U.S. 199, 208‑‑209, 80 S.Ct. 274, 4
L.Ed.2d 242 (1960); Pea v. United States, 130 U.S.App.D.C.
66, 397 F.2d 627, 631‑‑635 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Cooper v. Griffin, 455
F.2d 1142, 1144‑‑1145 (5th Cir. 1972); United States ex rel. Lynch v. Fay, 184 F.Supp.
277, 280‑‑281 (S.D.N.Y.1960), app. dism.,
284 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1960). See also
People v. Lara, 67 Cal.2d 365, 377‑‑378, 62 Cal.Rptr.
586, 432 P.2d 202 (1967); Commonwealth v. Masskow, ‑‑‑
Mass. ‑‑‑, ‑‑‑, 290 N.E.2d 154 (1972) (Mass.Adv.Sh. (1972)
1817, 1821‑‑1822), discussing Eisen v. Picard, 45i F.2d 860 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. den., 406 U.S.
950, 92 S.Ct. 2042, 32 L.Ed.2d 338 (1972).
FN7. The case went to the jury at 1:35 P.M. on
February 23, 1973. At 10:26 P.M. the
jury sent the judge a note that they were deadlocked. With the assent of counsel for Daniels, the
judge read to the jury portions of Commonwealth v. Tuey,
8 Cush. 1, 2‑‑3 (1851). (See now Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, ‑‑‑
Mass. ‑‑‑, 300 N.E.2d u92 (1973) (Mass.Adv.Sh. (1973) 1181).) The jury returned to their deliberations at
11 P.M. At 12:25 A.M. on February 24,
1973, the jury were sent to bed for the night.
Later that morning, shortly after 10 A.M., the jury resumed
deliberations. At 11:55 A.M., the jury
returned a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree.
FNe. Mass.Adv.Sh. (1974)
467, 473.
FNf. Mass.Adv.Sh. (1972)
1621.